As talk of war swirls, monarchists, republicans, and exiles jostle to shape the future. But Iran's opposition is deeply divided, both at home and abroad

Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics

The New Arab

As talk of war swirls, monarchists, republicans, and exiles jostle to shape the future. But Iran's opposition is deeply divided, both at home and abroad

War or diplomacy? That is the choice facing Washington as the White House weighs its next moves on Iran.

Yet within the Iranian opposition - at home and abroad - some are hoping that US President Donald Trump abandons the current talks held under Omani auspices and opts for military strikes, calculating that only external force can bring down the Islamic Republic.

What would such an intervention mean for Iran’s fractured opposition? What might the country’s political landscape look like in a post-Islamic Republic era?

There are no certain answers. But confronting these questions reveals the depth of division, desperation, and unresolved ambition shaping Iran’s opposition today.

Pahlavist revivalism and the limits of exiled leadership

The main opposition group to the Islamic Republic is the monarchists, commonly referred to as Pahlavists, who seek the restoration of Iran’s monarchy that was overthrown in 1979.

Although difficult to gauge exactly how much support the ousted Shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, currently has inside Iran, he undeniably has a constituency in a country he has not set foot in since the 1970s. 'Javid Shah' (long live the Shah) is a politically charged chant frequently heard these days at anti-government rallies in Iran and diaspora-led ones outside the country.

Support for Reza Pahlavi reflects more than nostalgia for the pre-1979 order. It also underscores his continued ability, despite decades in exile, to project symbolic leadership and encourage acts of dissent inside Iran.

Yet his appeal is far from universal. For many opposition figures, the authoritarian legacy of his father, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, disqualifies him. They argue that Iran’s future leadership must derive legitimacy from democratic consent rather than dynastic inheritance.

Controversy intensified during the latest protest wave, when Reza Pahlavi urged mass mobilisation without bearing the risks faced by demonstrators - many of whom encountered imprisonment or death. In this way, his leadership claim magnifies rifts within the opposition.

The MEK: Access abroad, detested at home

The People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran, better known as the MEK, constitutes another major group within the opposition to the Islamic Republic.

Its domestic legitimacy, however, is extremely limited. The group’s siding with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and its history of terrorism inside Iran have left a deep reservoir of public distrust. Across the country, there is widespread disdain for the organisation, which operates as a cult.

Abroad, however, the MEK’s considerable financial resources and sophisticated lobbying apparatus have secured it visibility and backing among segments of the political establishment in Washington and European capitals.

The ousted Shah's son, Reza Pahlavi, undeniably has some support in Iran, where he has not set foot in for decades. But for many opposition figures, the authoritarian legacy of his father disqualifies him. [Getty]
The result is a group with outsized international access but essentially no domestic credibility. This disconnect sharply limits its viability as a post-Islamic Republic alternative.

“Earlier, during the 1970s, they talked of a socialist-Islamist type of government. But their views might have changed. Some separatists support them,” explained Dr Shireen Hunter, an honorary fellow at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University who served as an Iranian diplomat before 1979, in an interview with The New Arab.

“But unless there is a total collapse of the political system in Iran and a foreign desire to partition Iran, I don't see separatism as the main threat to Iran's survival. Protests were mainly in the Persian heartland and not especially strong in minority provinces.”

Republican aspirations and reformist decline

A third current consists of republicans tracing their political and intellectual lineage to Mohammad Mossadegh, Iran’s nationalist prime minister deposed in 1953.

They advocate a secular republican order grounded in popular sovereignty. Yet, as Dr Hunter suggests, ideological commitments often intersect with more conventional political ambitions, and republicans, like other factions, are not immune to the gravitational pull of power.

Distinct from them are the reformists, who seek structural transformation without dismantling the Islamic Republic itself. Operating from within the system, they represented, at various moments, a plausible vehicle for gradual change.

According to Dr Hunter, their prospects were undermined by insufficient Western reciprocity to reformist overtures under figures such as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Hassan Rouhani. These missed opportunities, in her view, strengthened hardliners at reformists’ expense.

The interventionist calculus

Some opposition figures openly favour US and/or Israeli military strikes, calculating that only external force could overthrow the Islamic Republic and create a pathway to power. Yet this assumption rests on uncertain foundations.

Foreign intervention does not automatically translate into domestic legitimacy. On the contrary, it risks delegitimising opposition groups perceived as aligned with external actors, particularly in a political culture where sovereignty remains a deeply resonant principle.

Negar Mortazavi, a Washington-based Iranian journalist, host of The Iran Podcast, and senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, told TNA that such a foreign act of aggression against Iran would create not necessarily a “rally around the flag” effect but more of a “rally around the homeland” effect, and serve to bolster hardline elements in the government.

“I see a lot of opposition to war within civil society and among normal people who are not supportive of the government. So, I think that kind of attack, especially if it ends up harming civilians and civilian infrastructure, the way Israel’s attacks harmed them in June [2025], is going to create a rally around the homeland effect,” she explained.

The contrast between Washington’s strike - Operation Midnight Hammer, which targeted nuclear facilities and reportedly caused no casualties - and Israel’s June 2025 campaign is instructive, as Mortazavi noted.

The former produced a somewhat ambivalent reaction among many Iranians. The latter, by contrast, generated widespread anger and hatred toward Israel, including among citizens previously indifferent to the country. For many in Iran, the experience reinforced scepticism toward rhetoric framing military action as a vehicle for liberation.

“It really became clear to them that these ‘freedom bombs’, or Israel’s claims for bringing democracy or better governance, were just a mask for them to attack for their geopolitical purposes,” said Mortazavi.

“A large-scale US or Israeli military campaign would almost certainly trigger strong nationalist reactions,” explained Dr Ghoncheh Tazmini, author of Power Couple: Russian-Iranian Alignment in the Middle East, in a TNA interview.

“As seen during periods of heightened confrontation, namely the recent 12-day war, external pressure can temporarily consolidate domestic sentiment around national defence and on sovereignty grounds. However, as we have seen, Iranian society is not monolithic, as evidenced in the diaspora political spaces, where monarchist currents have aligned with foreign military action.”

In Dr Hunter’s opinion, the extent to which Iranians unite in the event of an American and/or Israeli attack will have much to do with how talks between Tehran and Washington pan out.

“As a rule, foreign intervention often leads to the attacked nation coming together. However, this time in Iran's case might be different, especially if the Iranian government refuses to reach an agreement with the US on the nuclear and other regional issues, which could avert an attack,” she told TNA.

“The people in Iran are totally against the policies of the regime, especially those favoured by hardliners and Khamenei himself. But if Iran agrees to reasonable American and Israeli demands and is still attacked, most likely people will rally around the flag.”

The illusion of liberation through foreign wars

Ultimately, the assumption that foreign military intervention would smooth the path to power for any opposition faction appears deeply flawed. Recent confrontations have shown that external attacks risk empowering hardliners in the Islamic Republic, reframing domestic dissent as disloyalty, and shifting public anger away from Tehran and toward Washington and Tel Aviv.

These dynamics are rooted not only in immediate nationalist reactions but also in a broader historical context that considers the weakening of reformist currents and the consolidation of hardline power during decades of sanctions, sabotaged diplomacy, and the lack of trust between Tehran and Western capitals.

Moments of potential recalibration repeatedly gave way to renewed estrangement, progressively narrowing the space for incremental change and reinforcing the perception within Iran that engagement with the West was pointless.

“If the West had responded to Iran’s overtures beginning in 1989 and had pursued a true policy of engagement and agreed to gradual and incremental change, the situation today would have been different. American pressures, partly because of Israeli insistence, have played a key role in weakening the reformists and strengthening the hardliners,” said Dr Hunter.

“Even today, a policy of constructive engagement, including economic, would be the best way to change Iran's behaviour and its regional role. Iran's collapse would have ramifications that no one can predict now. What is certain is that they would be negative and disruptive to the whole region.”