Six key factors differentiate the current round of negotiations from the 2015 process and increase the likelihood of a more successful and durable agreement.

By Esfandiar Khodaee

Modern Diplomacy

The 2015 Iran nuclear negotiations ultimately resulted in the fragile Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). While the deal initially raised hopes for sanctions relief, normalized relations between Iran and the West, and resolving the nuclear disputes, it proved short-lived and failed to meet objectives. Structural weaknesses, persistent distrust, and opposition from key stakeholders undermined the agreement. President Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 reignited tensions between Tehran and Washington, pushing the Middle East to the brink of successive crises.

Today, however, six key factors differentiate the current round of negotiations from the 2015 process and increase the likelihood of a more successful and durable agreement. The shift from a multilateral to a bilateral framework, Trump's personal motivation to cement a diplomatic legacy, the evolving regional power balance following the October 7 attacks and subsequent conflicts in the region, as well as changing positions among key players—including Israel, the U.S. Congress, and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf—all create a more favorable environment for a deal. Given these dynamics, the current negotiations have a higher probability of success and may yield an agreement that is both more effective and more sustainable than the JCPOA.

U.S.-Iran Bilateral Talks Offer a Greater Prospect of Agreement Than the P5+1 Format

Unlike the 2015 JCPOA, which involved six world powers alongside Iran, the 2025 negotiations between Trump and Tehran are fundamentally bilateral, with Oman serving only as a mediator. As a neutral party with no direct geopolitical rivalry with either the U.S. or Iran, Oman's role enhances the likelihood of productive discussions.

The 2015 JCPOA suffered from a fundamental structural flaw: its asymmetrical design. Iran offered substantial nuclear concessions, and the U.S. responded with sanctions relief. Meanwhile, China, Russia, and the European powers—despite benefiting economically from lifted sanctions—assumed no meaningful obligations and contributed little of substance. In essence, the agreement functioned as a bilateral Iran-U.S. deal, with the rest of the P5+1 adding diplomatic theater rather than strategic value. The current format, shaped during the Trump era and facilitated by Oman, rectifies this imbalance by narrowing the negotiation to the two principal stakeholders. This streamlined, bilateral framework enhances efficiency, focus, and equity, significantly improving the prospects for a durable agreement.

Multilateral negotiations are inherently complex. Divergent national interests among major powers like China, Russia, the U.S., and the European powers often create conflicting priorities, complicating consensus-building. The more actors involved, the more challenging it becomes to align national interests, manage diplomatic sessions, counter obstructionist influences, and maintain confidentiality—challenges that opponents of the deal, such as Israel, have previously exploited to derail progress.

In contrast, a streamlined, direct, and focused bilateral approach minimizes these risks and external interventions. The absence of multiple conflicting agendas makes coordination easier and accelerates the negotiation process. Consequently, Trump's bilateral talks with Iran are likely to progress more swiftly and with greater clarity than the JCPOA discussions.

Trump Seeks a Diplomatic Legacy, Not War

Trump is primarily driven by strategic goals as well as personal ambitions rather than ideological disputes. His focus remains on economic issues, trade disputes with China and others, territorial ambitions such as the annexation of Greenland and Canada, immigration concerns, and resolving ongoing crises in Ukraine and Gaza. Iran is not a top priority on his agenda—it is merely one item on a long list of objectives. When Iran is not the top priority, reconciliations get much easier and more probable.

Trump has internalized the historical lessons of George W. Bush's costly and prolonged war in Iraq and is unlikely to entangle the U.S. in another Middle Eastern military conflict. In 2018, he remarked at the University of Michigan, “The United States wasted seven trillion dollars in the Middle East with nothing to show for it.” Now, in what is expected to be his final term, Trump is focused on cementing a lasting legacy. He envisions himself among America's great presidents and has aspirations for a Nobel Peace Prize, akin to Barack Obama's 2009 award.

In contrast to some mainstream Republican leaders, Trump operates independently of neoconservative hawks and pro-Israel lobbies. His self-driven approach to policymaking means he is less constrained by traditional pressure groups, such as the Israel lobby, which prefers the U.S. to be entangled in the Middle East by getting involved in a war with Iran. President Trump's autonomy, combined with his desire to secure a landmark diplomatic achievement, enhances the prospects of a successful U.S.-Iran deal.

Iran

Iran has strong incentives to reach an agreement rather than risk a military confrontation with Trump, which could result in airstrikes on its nuclear infrastructure. Beyond the economic, political, and military costs of such a conflict, any significant damage to Iran's nuclear facilities would weaken its future bargaining power.

Economic challenges further reinforce Tehran's preference for diplomacy over escalation. Additionally, the JCPOA's snapback mechanism poses a looming threat. According to this mechanism, if no new deal is reached, the automatic re-imposition of UN sanctions could take effect in October 2025 at the request of the UK, France, or Germany without requiring a new Security Council vote. This would grant U.S. sanctions renewed international legitimacy, encouraging other nations to impose their own sanctions on Iran. Moreover, the election of Dr. Masoud Pezeshkian as Iran's president and the political system's support for negotiations signal Tehran's commitment to securing an agreement.

Congressional Republicans Also Prefer Diplomacy Over Military Confrontation

Unlike the JCPOA era, when Congress, influenced by the Israel lobby, stood against President Obama's diplomatic concession with Iran, today's Republican-controlled Congress aligns with Trump's executive authority. Lawmakers recognize that Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA has significantly advanced Iran's nuclear program. They now face a binary choice: war or diplomacy.

While some hawkish elements within the GOP remain skeptical, they are aware that President Biden's efforts to revive the JCPOA were obstructed by legislative barriers. The 2023 Iran Sanctions Review Act mandates congressional approval for any lifting of sanctions, a measure initially intended to block Biden from rejoining the deal.

However, with Trump now in the White House and Republicans controlling both chambers of Congress, the political calculus has shifted. Given Iran's progress toward nuclear capability, bipartisan support—or at least acquiescence—is more likely. A new agreement stands a better chance of congressional approval than the JCPOA did in 2015. However, it is expected that there will be voices of opposition to Trump's agreement with Iran, influenced by war hawks and pro-Israel hardliners in Congress.

Israel's Primary Concern Is Now Iran's Nuclear Program, Not Regional Proxy Wars

The geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically since 2015. The October 7 attacks, consequent wars and events in Gaza and Lebanon, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria have significantly changed the political environment for Israel. While Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA has brought Iran closer to nuclear breakout capability.

During the JCPOA era, Israel's primary concern was Iran's support for regional proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. However, today, its top priority is halting Iran's nuclear progress. Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar, have indicated that they might support a deal that effectively limits Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Despite this shift, Israel remains wary. Israel prefers a US airstrike attack against Iranian nuclear and military sites and then to go ahead with diplomatic talks. Its leadership fears that a U.S.-Iran agreement could redirect American strategic focus away from the Middle East toward Asia, weakening U.S. security commitments in the region. Furthermore, Israel hopes that any deal will include restrictions on Iran's missile program—an unlikely concession from Tehran. If Washington insists on missile limitations, negotiations could collapse because missiles are integral for Iran's security in the face of Israeli threats.

 Another Israeli concern is that sanctions relief would boost Iran's economy, indirectly strengthening groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis. However, Israel lacks the unilateral capability to prevent a U.S.-Iran agreement and cannot launch a large-scale attack on Iran's nuclear sites without American backing.

Persian Gulf Arab States Prefer Stability Over War

The wealthy Arab states of the Persian Gulf, acutely aware of their vulnerabilities, favor diplomacy over conflict. In the event of a U.S.-Iran war, their territories, waterways, and economies would become direct battlegrounds. American bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE would likely be used in any military campaign against Iran, prompting Iranian retaliatory strikes.

Unlike Israel, these states lack advanced missile defense systems comparable to the Iron Dome. They also understand that a second Trump administration may not offer the same level of security guarantees. Consequently, rather than obstructing negotiations, these countries are leveraging their diplomatic and media influence to facilitate an agreement.

This marks a shift from 2015, when Arab states were excluded from JCPOA negotiations and viewed a financially empowered Iran as a greater threat. However, following October 7, Israel is increasingly perceived as the region's more unpredictable actor and the main source of threat. For Persian Gulf states, a diplomatically engaged Iran is preferable to an isolated and militarized one.

****

The 2015 JCPOA was shaped by necessity but ultimately succumbed to political opposition. Today, the landscape has changed. The bilateral nature of the Trump-Iran negotiations, combined with evolving regional dynamics and Trump's personal ambitions, creates a more favorable environment for a deal.

The prospect for a new agreement between Iran and Trump appears significantly stronger compared to the fragile 2015 JCPOA, largely due to six major factors. First, the negotiations are now bilateral, with Oman as a neutral mediator, avoiding the complexities and rivalries that plagued the multilateral JCPOA talks. Second, President Trump is motivated to secure a lasting diplomatic legacy, aiming for achievements like ending the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, rather than pursuing ideological wars. Third, Iran now has stronger incentives to reach an agreement to avoid a devastating conflict and the automatic reimposition of UN sanctions through the “snapback” mechanism.

Fourth, the U.S. Congress, now dominated by pro-Trump Republicans, is more aligned with the President's agenda and likely to support or at least not obstruct the new agreement. Fifth, Israel's stance has shifted: while it was once worried primarily about regional proxies, following the October 7 attacks and subsequent events, now Israel prioritizes containing Iran's nuclear capabilities. Nevertheless, Israel remains cautious not to stand against the probable Trump deal with Iran.   Israel is also concerned that the U.S. might shift its focus away from the Middle East after the deal with Iran. Sixth, the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, concerned about regional stability, are more supportive of de-escalation efforts.

Given recent developments, Iran and the United States are closer than ever to reaching an agreement. At this critical juncture, failing to seize this opportunity could result in irreversible consequences for regional stability. As noted in a recent RAND report, ‘disregarding diplomatic windows has often led to heightened insecurity and instability.' It is also important to recognize that certain regional and international actors, whose interests are tied to the continuation of tension, are actively working toward the failure of these negotiations. The decision now is not merely a political choice but a strategic responsibility for the future of the region.

Esfandiar Khodaee has a Ph.D. in American Studies from the University of Tehran, Iran. He is focused on US-China Relations in the Middle East. His book: Iran Sanctions in US -China Relations, 2017