Amir Seifi

INTERNATIONAL POLICY DIGEST

Since its founding in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has treated hostage diplomacy not as an aberration but as a deliberate and calculated instrument of statecraft. The United States embassy takeover that same year—during which American diplomats were held for 444 days—wasn’t merely a revolutionary outburst; it was a template. Tehran realized early that seizing foreign nationals could yield more than just headlines. It could alter the calculus of international negotiations, shape domestic politics abroad, and extract high-value concessions. In one case, it may have even influenced the outcome of a U.S. presidential election.

More than four decades later, hostage-taking remains entrenched in the regime’s playbook. Whether carried out directly or through proxy groups like Hezbollah, Tehran has continually relied on the abduction and detention of foreigners to achieve its geopolitical aims. Yet while the broad strokes of Iran’s history of hostage diplomacy are well documented, recent shifts in both strategy and ambition suggest a more aggressive and destabilizing trajectory—one that the West appears dangerously unprepared to confront.

Traditionally, Iran has used hostages as bargaining chips—demanding the release of imprisoned operatives, the unfreezing of sanctioned assets, or diplomatic concessions in regional conflicts. Western governments, in turn, have often acquiesced—sometimes covertly—hoping to preserve negotiations or de-escalate tensions. Even during the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) talks in 2014, credible reports indicated that Tehran leveraged imprisoned foreign nationals to bolster its negotiating position.

But in recent years, something has changed. Hostage-taking in Iran is no longer primarily reactive or situational. Increasingly, it appears to be preemptive—arrests made not in response to specific grievances but in anticipation of future crises. Dual nationals and foreign citizens are detained without clear charges, held incommunicado, and kept off the diplomatic radar until Tehran decides the timing is right to raise the stakes.

This deliberate opacity explains why many hostage cases remain undisclosed for extended periods. Quiet backchannel negotiations unfold while Iran gauges the international climate. The implication is chilling: there may be more hostages in Iranian prisons than the public or their governments realize.

Worse still, the regime’s demands are escalating. Beyond the familiar calls for prisoner swaps and asset releases, Tehran has begun pressuring European governments to suppress Iranian dissident groups and to amplify regime propaganda. Cases involving convicted terrorists such as Asadollah Asadi or Hamid Noury, who was found guilty for the mass execution of political prisoners in 1988, exemplify the extent to which Iran now seeks not only freedom for its operatives but also political influence over foreign judicial and media systems.

By making concessions—however reluctantly—Western governments have validated this tactic. Every negotiated exchange sends a message that hostage-taking works, that the West will deal. It is an incentive structure Tehran has learned to exploit with unnerving precision.

Iran’s internal disarray only adds urgency to its external tactics. Facing a collapsed economy, mounting public unrest, and deepening dysfunction at home, the regime is also contending with a shifting international environment: a less predictable U.S. foreign policy, the erosion of Bashar al-Assad’s power in Syria, and weakening of proxy networks across the Middle East. In this context, hostage diplomacy has become both a pressure valve and a weapon of last resort.

Complicating matters further is the recent expiration of key provisions under UN Resolution 2231, which had imposed restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile activities and arms transfers. With France, Germany, and the UK weighing whether to invoke the JCPOA’s Snapback mechanism—which would reimpose a sweeping array of UN sanctions—Tehran may escalate further. Sabotage in Europe or a new wave of abductions cannot be ruled out.

Western governments now face a sobering truth: every capitulation to Iran’s hostage diplomacy undermines their own security. Tehran interprets each trade not as a gesture of goodwill or pragmatism, but as confirmation that its strategy is effective. And if it is effective, it will be repeated.

Public travel warnings have done little to deter dual nationals or adventurous tourists from entering Iran—or neighboring countries where Iranian operatives maintain reach. The threat is not just theoretical. It is strategic, targeted, and enduring.

What, then, can the West do? The answer lies not in reaction, but in deterrence. A unified, zero-tolerance policy toward hostage diplomacy is not only possible—it is essential.

Western democracies must articulate a clear doctrine: any future hostage-taking or terrorist operation will trigger automatic and severe consequences. These should include the immediate severance of diplomatic ties, expulsion of Iranian diplomats and affiliated individuals, and comprehensive sanctions targeting the regime’s leadership, financial institutions, and security apparatus. Most critically, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—long implicated in both hostage-taking and global terrorism—must be designated a terrorist organization by European governments, aligning policy with reality.

Such a strategy would not be without risk. But it would restore the credibility that incrementalism and appeasement have eroded. Iran must be made to understand that the cost of hostage diplomacy will always exceed its benefits.

Until that message is sent—loudly, clearly, and collectively—the West will continue to play Tehran’s game. And it will continue to lose.

Amir Seifi is an Irish-Iranian human rights activist and engineering manager. Following the student uprising of 1999, he had to leave Iran along with his family who have a long history as political activists and prisoners in Iran.