Foreign Policy:
BY HENRY FARRELL, ABRAHAM NEWMAN
Over the years, the United States benefited from spreading a fear of contagion. When states or businesses or individuals incurred the displeasure of U.S. financial authorities, they were treated by others as though they had the plague. They worried that pariah status might be catching (even accidental or innocent contact with a sanctioned party might be interpreted in unfortunate ways), and hence they avoided all association. This sometimes turned out to be a nuisance for U.S. policymakers. For example, businesses rarely took advantage of sanctions exemptions that were supposed to allow the export of freedom-enhancing technologies to Iran for fear that they might accidentally do something that the United States would punish. However, in general, this fear increased the efficacy of sanctions, by discouraging businesses from trying to game the rules.
If the United States continues along its current path, the fear of contagion may start to have quite different consequences. Instead of leading states and businesses to minimize contact with the targets of U.S. sanctions, it may lead states and businesses to minimize their contact with the U.S.-led global financial system and to start to construct their own workarounds. Over time, those workarounds might even begin to accumulate into an effective alternative system. Financial arrangements such as SWIFT and dollar clearing were responses to the incentives and profit opportunities of globalized financial markets. Now, U.S. unilateralism is changing those incentives and profit opportunities in unpredictable ways.
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Germany does not allow Euro to be used as an instrument of foreign policy and until it does, there is no rival to the USD so for now it is simply wishful thinking that the dominance of world finance by the US can be challenged:
Europe will never be a top-tier geopolitical power
Despite the lack of a joint army, the EU has potent geopolitical tools. The European Economic Community started with a common external commercial policy, signed in 1957. The Maastricht treaty 35 years later created the instruments of a common foreign and security policy and a monetary union.
Among those, trade policy and the euro are potentially the most potent. With its launch in 1999, the euro immediately became the world’s second-largest currency for official reserves, for invoicing and international financial transactions. But it never even came close to rivalling the US dollar. Its distant second place was a conscious choice. EU leaders were always more concerned with the internal stability of the monetary union — price and fiscal stability — than the currency’s potential use as a foreign policy tool.
Back then, the external security framework of most EU members was taken care of by Nato. The EU had no ethical qualms about the global imbalances that arose in the early 2000s. The US was conveniently mopping up the savings surpluses of newly industrialised countries and, later, of the eurozone. The EU was a happy free rider both militarily and economically.