“The images and data broadcast by international media do not represent even one percent of the reality, because the information simply does not reach them.”

Center for Human Rights in Iran

January 12, 2026 — The following interview presents rare, first-hand testimony from a physician who treated large numbers of wounded protesters in Iran over the past week (January 6-10) during the nationwide protests that have overtaken the country.

Speaking after leaving Iran, the doctor provides a detailed account of what he witnessed inside hospitals and on the streets of Tehran and Isfahan as the Islamic Republic escalated its response from crowd control tactics to the use of live ammunition and military-grade weapons.

His testimony describes a deliberate internet and communications blackout; mass-casualty conditions overwhelming hospitals; systematic identification and tracking of injured protesters inside medical facilities; and the deployment of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij forces using lethal force, including automatic weapons, against civilians. The account strongly indicates that security forces were operating under orders that eliminated accountability and treated civilian protests as a wartime scenario.

This interview was conducted by the Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI) on January 11, 2026, and is now published in order to alert the international community—governments worldwide, the UN, and major media outlets—to credible evidence of mass, unlawful, lethal state violence against protesters, and to the extraordinary scale of state killings, injuries, and violent repression that remains largely hidden due to the Islamic Republic’s internet and communications shutdown.

Key Findings from the Doctor’s Testimony:

• Use of live ammunition and military-grade weapons against civilians: The doctor reported a clear shift from pellet shotguns to close-range gunfire intended to kill, including automatic weapons and heavy machine guns typically used by IRGC units, with the change in weaponry reflected in the nature of the injuries as of the evening of January 8.
• Mass-casualty conditions in hospitals: Hospitals were rapidly overwhelmed, performing an extraordinary number of emergency surgeries for gunshot wounds, particularly severe head, chest, and abdominal injuries. Many victims arrived dead.
• Systematic surveillance and intimidation in medical facilities: Security forces were present in hospitals, collecting names, national ID numbers, and personal details of injured patients, creating fear and discouraging people from seeking lifesaving care.
• Communications blackout and collapse of emergency services: Internet, mobile networks, emergency police, fire services, navigation systems, and payment infrastructure were cut or disabled, obstructing medical, emergency, and humanitarian response.
• Scale of killings far beyond official or media reporting: Based on hospital conditions and deaths observed, the doctor estimates that in Isfahan alone, hundreds were likely killed over several days, with the true toll impossible to verify under blackout conditions.
• Victims included children, the elderly, and bystanders: Those shot ranged from teenagers to elderly men, and people were killed simply for being present in public spaces, not necessarily participating in protests.

Critical Excerpts from the Interview

“The images and data broadcast by the international media do not represent even one percent of the reality, because the information simply does not reach them.”

“When I went to the hospital, I saw that the nature of the injuries and the number of gunshot wounds had changed completely. Shots from close range, injuries leading to death.”

“This was a mass-casualty situation. Our facilities, space, and personnel were far below the number of injured people arriving.”

“If someone came in with a gunshot wound, security forces would collect their first and last name, national ID number, and any information they could, to follow up later.”

“From midnight [of Thursday, January 8] onward, the calls were no longer about pellet wounds. People were saying they had been shot—bullets entering one side of the body and exiting the other. Live ammunition.”

“My belief is that security forces were told there would be no accountability. No investigations. This was treated as a wartime situation. Go and suppress by any means.”

“I heard automatic gunfire. I heard DShK heavy machine guns. These weapons are in the possession of IRGC units.”

“Witnesses told me they saw pickup trucks with mounted heavy machine guns driving through streets…. The trauma cases I saw were brutal, shoot-to-kill.”

“Where in the world do you have permission to use automatic fire in the street? This was treated as a wartime situation—go and suppress by any means.”

“You did not need to be a protester to be shot. You could just be passing by.”

This testimony offers a stark, medically grounded account of how the Islamic Republic has responded to civilian protest with overwhelming and unlawful lethal force. It underscores the urgent need for international action to address the ongoing lethal state violence faced by civilians in Iran.

The full interview follows:

The images and data broadcast by the international media do not represent even one percent of the reality, because the information simply does not reach them.

Starting Tuesday [January 6] night, people would go out, chant a bit, and protest. Law enforcement forces were firing pellet shotguns that scatter pellets. During those days, I received five or six calls per day about people who had been hit by two pellets in the back, or pellets to the head or scalp. These were relatively superficial injuries.

Life was relatively normal until about 8:00 in the evening on Thursday [January 8] when the internet was cut. Then mobile networks were also cut. You could not send SMS to anyone, email was down, and Google Maps was inaccessible.

That night around 8:00 pm I was in Tehran and I saw noise, chanting, and unrest. From about 8:10 to 8:20 pm, the sound of bullets, gunfire, screams, and sporadic explosions could be heard.

I was called to the hospital. When I arrived, I saw that the nature of the injuries and the number of gunshot wounds had changed completely. The situation was totally different. Shots from close range, injuries leading to death. It was not possible for anyone to give an accurate death toll, whether one thousand, three thousand, or whatever.

The main issue was that the facilities, the physical space, and the personnel capacity were far below the volume of injured people arriving. We call this a mass casualty. Mass casualty means your resources cannot support the situation. That is the phase we were in.

[We were] calling all medical personnel to come in. The hospital was extremely crowded. The risk of error was extremely high. At the same time, internal hospital internet systems were not working properly. For example, when they tried to enter the name of a disease for insurance, no information would come up in the system. There was no internet to retrieve data.

We were told security forces were present in hospitals and that they were not interfering in treatment, but in practice, they were. For example, if someone came in with a gunshot wound, [the security forces] would collect their first and last name, national ID number, and any information they could, to follow up later.

Many public services were completely inaccessible. For example, the emergency number 110; we could not call the police if someone needed help. We could not reach 115 (fire and emergency services). All of these were out of service. There was no way to communicate. If someone needed to reach me, they had to call my home phone.

Mobile phones worked until around 11:00 or 12:00 on Thursday night. You could see signal bars on the phone, but there was no functionality.

Based on my experience from previous [protests], if I compare the level of confrontation and injury in these three days with the entire six months of the Jina [Mahsa Amini] movement, they are not comparable at all. The scale of destruction, the total paralysis, and the absolute silence from the government side were completely different from the Jina movement.

Regarding how security forces collected information on the injured protesters in hospitals, based on past experience, usually two days after things came under some control, a letter from security institutions would be sent to the hospital, requesting information on a specific injured patient. The hospital was forced to hand over this information. Hospitals cannot engage in political resistance. If a hospital director refuses, a case is fabricated against them.

During these days, when injured people called me, depending on the severity of their injuries, I advised them to give a false name at the hospital or say they did not remember their national ID number. But even before the protests became serious and widespread, a directive was issued to insurance doctors, instructing them to separately report the details of injured protesters to insurance companies.

Security organizations [then] requested this information from the insurance companies. I know this for a fact because I saw the letter. I believe it was last Saturday or Sunday when I saw it in a WhatsApp group. It stated that information on patients injured in recent incidents who visited medical centers had to be compiled in a file and sent to insurance organizations.

This is how control is exercised. But in my personal experience, I did not see security forces directly preventing treatment or taking someone away while being treated. But the recording of their information was very strict.

The severity of injuries was such that in a hospital that normally handles maybe two emergency surgical cases, between 9:00 pm and 6:00 a.m. on Thursday night, about eighteen surgeries were performed, all on patients with severe head injuries.

Friday morning [January 9] arrived. I was still in the operating room. Some patients from the night before were still in surgery.

Later on Friday, I travelled to Isfahan. I arrived in the afternoon.

My observations in the streets of Tehran and Isfahan:

In Tehran, along the route from Valiasr Square to Azadi Square toward Mehrabad Airport on Enghelab Street, all metro stations were damaged. They had been set on fire and then extinguished, and all the glass was shattered. Bus stops had all their glass broken. Metal barriers in the middle of the street had been torn out. The only people on the street were welders and street cleaners. All traffic lights were out of service, perhaps because there were cameras on them or to completely paralyze movement.

On Friday, it took me one hour and fifty minutes to go from Valiasr Square to Azadi Square. Normally, on a Friday, this takes less than ten minutes. Why? Because none of the intersections had traffic lights, and there were no traffic police.

People were letting each other pass out of goodwill. There was no access to ride-hailing apps. Getting a taxi was impossible. I called friends to help me reach my flight. All street barriers were destroyed. All street signs were covered with slogans. You could not find a single readable sign. Everything was covered with slogans like Long live the Shah, Death to Khamenei, Death to the Islamic Republic, Death to the dictator.

We had never experienced this level of disruption before. During the Mahsa [2022 Woman Life Freedom] uprising, this did not happen.

When I reached Isfahan, the city looked the same as Tehran. Traffic lights were broken, and signs were spray-painted with slogans. From midnight Thursday onward, the calls I received on my home phone for medical advice were no longer about pellet wounds. People were saying they had been shot, with bullets entering one side of the body and exiting the other. Live ammunition. It seemed the order had been given from Thursday night. I have no document to prove this.

For example, someone called at 2:00 a.m., saying someone had been shot above the knee and the bullet exited the sole of the foot. Another called Friday morning saying a bullet entered the abdomen and exited the side. I would gather detailed information over the phone to assess the severity.

In Isfahan, I stayed in contact with friends working in hospitals. Everyone said Thursday night was catastrophic. One friend said the on-call surgeon could not handle the workload. He and three others went into surgery, and by morning, they had performed thirteen abdominal and chest surgeries due to gunshot wounds.

I do not have exact death statistics, but imagine a hospital that normally sees one death per twenty-four hours receiving eight dead bodies on Thursday night alone. These were patients who had been shot and were already dead when they arrived. Even private hospitals that normally receive zero trauma cases were overwhelmed. One friend called my home phone and said the situation was disastrous, with no staff and three operating rooms running without backup, too many injured, and insufficient personnel and equipment.

I do not have numbers, but I can say that at least twenty hospitals in Isfahan were in a similar condition. If we do a rough calculation, in Isfahan alone over these three days, two hundred people were killed.

I saw a horrifying scene on a street in Isfahan. A large amount of blood, about a liter, had pooled in the gutter and blood trails extended for several meters. I am certain someone who lost that much blood could not have reached the hospital alive.

The level and intensity of violence increased step by step. Before Thursday night, I did not hear automatic fire. Just single shots. But on Friday night, I heard automatic gunfire.

I am familiar with weapons and can distinguish their sounds. I heard DShK heavy machine guns. I heard PK machine guns.

There was news that the IRGC had told the police to step aside and that they would handle the repression themselves. The IRGC has capabilities the police do not, and the level of ideological indoctrination differs. The violence being applied did not look like police violence. It appeared to be IRGC violence.

In the streets, the presence of Basij and IRGC forces was greater than police. Based on their uniforms and markings, they far outnumbered police. These are my observations from Thursday afternoon in Tehran.

I went from Toopkhaneh Square to Moallem Street around noon on Thursday. But at every intersection, at least thirty or forty armed personnel on motorcycles were standing there.

The nature of violence changed. The sounds became more terrifying. On Friday night, even in our usually quiet neighborhood, I heard automatic gunfire. Sounds I had never experienced before.

You asked whether the destruction seen in Tehran also existed in Isfahan. Yes, absolutely. Street cleaners were instructed to start earlier to cover up the destruction so it would appear less severe. You would be shocked seeing it. Not a single traffic light intact, not a single bus stop intact. Unlike previous protests where private property was damaged, this time the damage targeted government buildings, municipalities, police stations. The aim was to paralyze the state.

What I understood is that as time went on, up to this morning, the violence escalated. The naked face of the Islamic government became clear.

You all probably saw the interview where an [Iranian] official said do not come out on Saturday or your life is your responsibility. He was telling the truth. There was also a state TV video of a father crying that his child was shot in the street. You do not need to be a protester to be shot. You could just be passing by.

My belief is that security forces were told there would be no accountability. No investigations. This was treated as a wartime situation. Go and suppress by any means.

Where in the world do you have permission to use automatic fire in the street? Even with a military background, I can tell you Kalashnikovs are not allowed on automatic fire even at shooting ranges.

The heavy weapon sounds, I heard them in Isfahan as well. In Tehran, I was mostly inside the operating room that night, but in Isfahan on Friday, I am sure I heard DShK fire. Witnesses told me they saw pickup trucks with mounted heavy machine guns driving through the streets.

These weapons are in the possession of IRGC units. The trauma cases I saw were brutal, shoot-to-kill. Police training does not involve shooting to kill immediately. Here, it was first shot to the abdomen, first shot to the chest, and random automatic fire into crowds.

When people called me, it was from everywhere. I would answer and ask who was shot. I would ask screening questions to decide whether they needed to go to a hospital. Not going sometimes meant avoiding unnecessary strain on limited resources and avoiding security follow-up, which people feared more.

On Thursday and Friday, I probably received 300 to 500 calls. I normally charge my phone once a day. In those twenty-four hours, I charged it three times because it kept ringing and overheating.

People spoke in code out of fear of surveillance. I would tell them not to be afraid and ask where the bullet hit and from what distance. For pellet wounds, people asked me to remove the pellets. I told them to leave them. Do not worry. It will not get infected. It will barely show on X-ray. Airport scanners will not detect it.

As for age, injuries ranged from sixteen-year-old children to seventy-year-old men. But the majority of protesters were between eighteen and twenty-eight.

The slogans were explicit. ‘Death to Khamenei’ was openly shouted. The courage of these young people was astonishing. The level of anger and desperation was such that they accepted even a ten percent chance of being shot to bring this to an end.

One colleague told me that during one night shift, eight bodies were brought in with shotgun pellets to the face, faces unrecognizable. Many bodies are not identifiable at all.

*This doctor has since left Iran.