The New Yorker:

The Administration is strong-arming European nations to do more on behalf of their own defense. Is the strategy working?

By Joshua Yaffa

The headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in Brussels, with eight crisscrossing glass-and-steel wings, was designed to resemble a set of interlocking fingers—a reference to what its architect called “the coming together of all nations in one common space.” Inside, the allocation of that space reflects certain geopolitical realities. The nine-person delegation from Iceland, the alliance’s only member without a standing army, occupies a half-dozen offices; France has a whole floor; Germany has two. The U.S. mission, with a staff of more than two hundred, representing a global force deployed in nearly a hundred and fifty countries, takes up an entire five-story wing.

One morning this spring, on an outdoor walkway that leads to what is known as the building’s Public Square, I passed a twisted knot of rusted steel, a remnant of the World Trade Center’s North Tower which was collected after the 2001 terrorist attacks. nato dubbed the artifact the 9/11 and Article 5 Memorial, a testament to the sole instance in the alliance’s history in which its leaders have invoked the collective-defense clause in its founding charter. Article 5 is the core principle of the alliance, stating, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” During the next two decades, twenty-nine non-U.S. nato militaries deployed soldiers to Afghanistan, more than a thousand of whom died.

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