Iran is at a turning point. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is 86 years old (born in 1939). The 12-Day War with Israel and the United States in June 2025 was a catastrophic defeat for Khamenei and his regime. The economy has been deteriorating fast in 2025. Rather than changing course, Khamenei’s response has been to rebuild Iran’s missile and nuclear programs as well as rejuvenate it’s proxy groups. Officials and observers in Iran, Israel, and the United States have publicly stated that if Khamenei’s policies continue, another far more devastating war is forthcoming.

The political situation in Iran is volatile and fluid. Khamenei’s policies have come under criticism from figures inside the regime and Iranian citizens opposed to fundamentalism. Iranian society is highly fragmented and polarized. No leaders and no popular movements have succeeded in garnering the support of even a simple majority. In this article, I will discuss alternative scenarios for Iran’s future and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each group and personality that might play a major role in Iran’s politics.

Khamenei Triumphant

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been the Supreme Leader since June 1989. The political system in Iran is called “Velayat Motlagh Faghih” [Absolute Rule of a High-Ranking Shia Cleric]. This system was developed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and is the Shia version of the Sunni variety that was developed by The Muslem Brothers under the leaderships of Hassan Al-Banna and Seyyed Qotb. It is a far-right wing totalitarian politicized interpretation of Islam and argues that the sole legitimate form of government is an Islamist form of government whereby Sharia [Islamic theological law] is the sole or primary basis of government and laws of a country. I use the term “fundamentalist” to refer to this extremist right-wing form of ideology and form of government.

The regime believes that it could continue these policies until either Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or American President Donald Trump is out of office.

Khamenei and his hardline supporters believe that the fundamentalist regime is strong enough to survive any potential wars with Israel and the United States. By continuing former policies, they want to increase the regime’s power to respond to any attacks from Israel or the United States, which they believe will deter future attacks. Domestically, the regime has both drastically increased repression and made minor, easily reversible concessions. The regime has drastically increased executions since 2021. Executions went up by 106 percent in 2025 to over 1,920. Since the revolution, Iran has had the highest per capita executions in the world. It has drastically increased arrests of political and civil society activists. Conversely, however, it has relaxed the harsh enforcement of compulsory hijab. It has allowed music and singing in public. It has also made appeals to Iranian nationalism, which the Shia Islamic fundamentalist ideology of the regime has attacked since the revolution. The regime believes that it could continue these policies until either Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or American President Donald Trump is out of office. In the long run, another hardline person – such as Khamenei’s son Mojtaba – could become the next Supreme Leader.

Ultra-Hardline Supreme Leader

The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel further increased the power of ultra-hardliners in Iran. Until his death on May 19, 2024, it was widely believed that Ebrahim Raisi would become the next Supreme Leader. Until the 12-Day War in June 2025, one of the most likely candidates to succeed Khamenei was Ayatollah Mohammad Mehdi Mir-Bagheri. Ayatollah Mir-Bagher is the clerical leader of the Steadfast Front, the most extreme ultra-hardline faction in the regime. Mir-Bagheri is a powerful member of the Assembly of Experts (the body which the fundamentalist constitution assigns the responsibility to select the Supreme Leader) and a persuasive public speaker. The Steadfast Front is highly organized and possesses enormous influence within the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iranian intelligence organizations. If Khamenei were to die of natural causes or assassinated by Israel, Mir-Bagheri is the most likely person to become the Supreme Leader. Mir-Bagheri advocates war with infidels (e.g., the U.S. and Israel) until they are defeated. According to Mir-Bagheri:

We believe in peace, but lasting peace comes after a lasting war and jihad, and until you leave this lasting jihad behind and eliminate the false front, lasting peace will not be established in the world…. It is naïve and superficial to say: We are also in favor of peace; you must eliminate sedition so that peace can come about… We must go through a long war and there is no room for complacency at all.

Mir-Bagheri also argues that the powers of the President should be further reduced and the powers of the Supreme Leader further increased.

There are major differences between Khamenei and his hardline supporters and Mir-Bagheri and his ultra-hardline supporters. Khamenei did allow reformist, expedient, and chameleon factions of the fundamentalist oligarchy to exist and hold power in the Majles (fundamentalist-only parliament) and the Presidency. Mir-Bagheri and the ultra-hardliners wish to monopolize power in the hands of ultra-hardliners and hard-liners. At a minimum, the ultra-hardliners (Mir-Bagheri and the Steadfast Front) want to deny any political power to other factions. They routinely call for executions of top members of the fundamentalist oligarchy such as Rouhani, Mir-Hussein Moussavi, Mehdi Karrobi, and Khatami, who have criticized Khamenei and his policies.

Mir-Bagheri was born in 1961. If he became Supreme Leader, he might hold that position for decades. Mir-Bagheri is young in comparison to other top leaders in the regime. For example, the Head of the Assembly of Experts Ayatollah Mohammad-Ali Movahedi Kermani was born in 1931 and the Head of the Council of Guardians Ayatollah Ahmad Jennati was born in 1927. Factions within the fundamentalist oligarchy who are not ultra-hardline or hardline would strongly oppose Mir-Bagheri. President Pezeshkian told the Majles on November 11, 2025, that during the 12-Day War, his major worry was that if Khamenei was eliminated, then the different factions would attack each other and the regime would collapse; Israel would not even need to invade. Pezeshkian made public the possibility of major bloody war among fundamentalist elites for the position of Supreme Leader.

Salvaging the Fundamentalist Regime Via Fundamentalist Elites

Former President Ayatollah Hassan Rouhani has emerged as the main fundamentalist leader arguing that fundamental changes are necessary if the fundamentalist regime is going to survive. Before the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel, Khamenei successfully marginalized and isolated Rouhani. After the 12-Day War, Rouhani made several highly effective public speeches arguing that the regime could collapse if the current policies continue and how the regime could survive by pursuing different policies.

Rouhani (born November 12, 1948) is a founding member of the fundamentalist regime. He has consistently been one of the top 20 leaders of the fundamentalist oligarchy since 1979. Rouhani is one of the most articulate members of the fundamentalist oligarchy and one of the least ideological and most pragmatic members of the oligarchy. His primary objective is the continuation of the fundamentalist regime. After October 7, 2023 and before the 12-Day War, Rouhani publicly warned of the threat to the regime if the regime made “one mistake.”  After the 12-Day War, his warnings became more ominous. Rouhani advocates major diplomatic concessions to the U.S. as well as major changes in domestic politics. Rouhani argues that he has the diplomatic skills to make deals with the U.S. that could save the fundamentalist regime. Hardliners have increased their attacks on Rouhani in reaction to his calls for change with some calling for his trial and execution.

Fundamentalist Gorbachev

Reformist members of the fundamentalist oligarchy argue that the best way to save the regime is making serious reforms in politics, economy, and foreign policy. The top two such members are Ayatollah Mohammad Khatami (former President) and Ayatollah Hassan Khomeini (the grandson of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the regime). They advocate for generally progressive political reforms such as reducing repressive policies, easing restrictions on the press, and allowing all fundamentalist factions to run for various offices. They advocate for economic reforms such as reducing the economic stranglehold of fundamentalist entities and the IRGC who control at least 60 percent of the economy. They advocate major diplomatic concessions to the U.S., Europe, neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as well as de facto détente with Israel. The reformists believe that the position of the Supreme Leader is too strong to be challenged as long as Khamenei is alive. Before the 12-Day War, this scenario was not realistic. Since the 12-Day War, they sheepishly increased public advocacy for their views. They plead with other powerful members of the oligarchy, arguing that the regime risks being overthrown if the current policies continue. The hardliners argue that the concessions suggested by the reformists would cause the collapse of the fundamentalist regime similar to Gorbachev’s reforms that caused the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Fundamentalist Yeltsin

There are former members of the fundamentalist oligarchy who argue that the fundamentalist experiment is a total failure and that the only possible solution is to transition to democracy. The most prominent members of this group are former prime minister Mir-Hussein Moussavi and former Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh. Members of this group fear that Khamenei’s policies would not only cause the collapse of the regime but also cause the disintegration or destruction of Iran.

IRGC Junta

A military coup by the IRGC is a major possibility. This is particularly likely if Khamenei is assassinated, either by Israel or a figure inside the regime. Leaders of the IRGC are extremely despised by the public; in presidential elections, IRGC generals (e.g., Mohsen Rezaee, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, and Ali Shamkhani) that were allowed to run were defeated in landslides. Despite repeated attempts, no IRGC general has become president. It is not clear whether an IRGC military regime would be more or less bellicose. It is also not clear whether an IRGC regime would be more or less repressive than the current regime.

Opposition to the Fundamentalist Regime

According to GAMAAN, between 16 and 20 percent of Iranians inside Iran support the fundamentalist regime while about 70 to 80 percent of the population opposes the regime.

There are no reliable opinion polls of the Iranian public because the regime is extremely repressive and violent. The people are afraid to share their true opinions with pollsters for the real possibility of arrest, torture, execution, and murder by the regime if they expressed support for changing the regime. One of the few polls that might closely capture the opinion of Iranians is the “Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran” (GAMAAN). Unlike phone calls, GAMAAN uses VPNs and social media platforms to reach a representative sample of the Iranian population and allows safe way for the respondents to provide their answers. According to GAMAAN, between 16 and 20 percent of Iranians inside Iran support the fundamentalist regime while about 70 to 80 percent of the population opposes the regime. If one group or one person represented 70 to 80 percent of the population, then that opposition would have been able to mobilize and organize the population to overthrow the regime. Like the fundamentalist regime, the opposition is also terribly fragmented and polarized. About 26 percent of the population supports a secular democratic republic, the largest group out of those who oppose the regime. The second largest group is the monarchists with about 21 percent. Democratic advocates and monarchists also suffer from internal divisions.

Democratic Republicans

The largest group within the pro-democracy forces is the Iran National Front (INF). The INF was founded in 1949 by Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. The INF has been a coalition of secular social democrats, secular liberal democrats, liberal Islamists, democratic socialists, and liberal nationalists. According to GAMAAN, a little over 10 percent of the population supports the INF. The INF struggles to replace the fundamentalist regime with a secular democratic republic that has a multiparty parliamentary system. The INF is highly active both inside and outside Iran. The inside organization is under the courageous leadership of Dr. Hussein Moussavi. The outside branch is called “INF-Organizations Abroad” (INF-OA). The INF-OA has been highly active under the able leadership of Dr. Homayoun Mehmaneche. The INF-OA has entered into a broad coalition with several other republican groups. The coalition is called “Coalition for a Secular and Democratic Republic in Iran” (CSDRI), called “Hamgami” in Persian, a term for “coalition.” The members of the coalition include the Left Party of Iran (LPI), the Solidarity for Secular Republic in Iran, and United Republicans of Iran. The LPI is the largest leftist party in Iran. After the INF, the Solidarity for Secular Republic and the United Republicans are the largest republican parties in Iran. The democratic republicans advocate a non-violent transition to democracy in Iran.

Not all democratic republicans have joined the Hamgami. If there are free elections in Iran, this group has the highest likelihood of winning such elections. Their social base is the highly educated modern middle class; they are over-represented among university students. For example, in early 2003 a large internet poll of students at the Amir Kabir University (the second most prestigious university in Iran) was conducted by the Daftar Tahkim Vahdat, the official student umbrella group (affiliated with the reformist faction of the regime). The results were posted on the university’s student website until they were ordered to remove it. In the poll, 6 percent of the students supported the hard-liners, 4 percent supported the reformists, 5 percent supported the monarchy, and 85 percent supported the establishment of a democratic and secular republic.

Many civil society activists are democratic republicans. Civil society groups include university students, university professors, lawyers, women’s rights, labor rights, human rights, and physicians.

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