ROGHAYEH REZAEI, IranWire: 

The question of Iran’s future following a regime that has likely orchestrated one of the most unprecedented and extensive massacres in contemporary global history is a fundamental one.

We sat down with Abdullah Mohtadi, Secretary-General of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan and a veteran Kurdish political leader, to talk about Iran’s future. Mohtadi has led one of the two main political currents in Iranian Kurdistan since 1979 - the same period when the newly established Islamic Republic, under Ruhollah Khomeini, opened fire on Kurdish citizens.

I asked him whether he believes the Islamic Republic can fall through the will of the Iranian people or only through war. I also asked whether the timing of the Kurdish parties’ general strike call - issued around the same time as Prince Reza Pahlavi’s call - was intentional, and whether he is open to forming a coalition with other non-monarchist currents, including republicans, other ethnic groups, women, the left, and human rights activists.

Mohtadi, who has for years been accused of “appeasement” toward the Islamic Republic by armed leftist groups and of “separatism” by right-wing and Iranian nationalist groups, stated: “The future of Iran must be free. A future in which there is no inquisition of beliefs, but rather freedom of expression, freedom of the press, full citizenship rights, and freedom for political parties. I believe the future of Iran must be a secular society.”

He argues that all political groups - monarchist and non-monarchist alike - must share one common goal: the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. In his view, Iran’s social and political trajectory has reached a point where no meaningful change in people’s lives, politics, the economy, or foreign relations is possible without moving beyond this regime.

The Interview

Mr. Mohtadi, why do you think the Islamic Republic carried out a massacre on such a vast scale and with such a high level of violence?

I have said this elsewhere as well. I believe that the Islamic Republic was prepared for such a crackdown. They had practiced it. They had drawn up plans and designed it. They had reviewed many times that if things reached a stage they deemed dangerous, where the masses entered the field and the security forces’ usual methods and equipment couldn’t handle them, they would execute that “Grand Plan.”

Furthermore, I believe that, for one or two reasons, they actually welcomed it. In the eyes of the Islamic Republic, they have two enemies: the internal enemy, which is the people, and the external enemy, which is America, Israel, the Arabs, the non-Arabs, and everyone else in the world. They fear the external enemy less than the internal one. If they have to face one of these two, they prefer to face American and Israeli missiles rather than a popular uprising. In the former, a number of their commanders and personnel might be killed, and the leadership might go into hiding or even take a hit, but the regime remains standing. We know that regimes do not collapse simply by bombardment alone, not unless, at some stage, the people and the great popular infantry, who ultimately determine the fate of all governments, step into the middle.

Therefore, they knew that because of the economic collapse and the dire situation, for which there is no remedy, the possibility of people returning to the streets is always there. Thus, they felt they had to settle the matter once and for all. In their own mind, they wanted to settle accounts with the Iranian people and a whole generation, so that people would forget and no longer dare to enter the field.

Secondly, they anticipated the possibility of a coming war. They know how rigid they are regarding the concessions America and the world want from them, and they know they don’t want to give those concessions. They won’t let go of their proxies, their missiles, or their nuclear program. For these reasons - the high probability of people returning to the streets and the possibility of an attack - they wanted to settle a major account with the people before either of those happened. They wanted to kill; it was intentional. There are reports now of them funneling people into dead-end alleys and killing them without any reason. They killed passersby. They killed people who posed no threat. I think their goal was such a massive settlement of accounts so that if external conditions arose or another war broke out, the people would not have the strength or endurance for another uprising.

Simultaneously with Mr. Pahlavi, you and six Kurdish parties issued a statement calling for a general strike in Kurdish cities. Was this timing intentional? What was your intention?

No, it was not intentional. We had no coordination with him or anyone else. The Kurdish parties decided for themselves to call a general strike in support of the great popular movement that had started in Tehran and other cities, and as an expression of solidarity. The people in Kurdish cities fully observed and accepted this call. Mr. Pahlavi’s call came a bit later than the call of the Kurdish parties, and his call gained a response in other Iranian cities, such as Tehran and elsewhere. But there was no coordination.

My other question is about the Mahsa movement [2022] and the January protests. In the Mahsa movement, protests started in Kurdistan and spread to the rest of Iran. But in January, it seems the opposite happened: it started elsewhere and reached Kurdish cities. What is your analysis?

Revolutions in a country do not always start from the same place or for the same reason. What happened in Kurdistan [in 2022] was, on one hand, the product of decades of struggle by the Kurdish people and their political culture. In a very strange and unique way, it resonated with the core of people across all of Iran. It spoke to many consciences. The demands of the Kurdish people, “Woman, Life, Freedom,” were demands the people of Iran also shared. Thus, there was a great harmony, a shared voice, a sense of participation, a shared pain, and a shared response to that pain; these were clearly visible. Kurdistan was both the initiator and the provider of the main slogan and content. It remained the main bastion, but fortunately, it did not stay limited to Kurdistan and spread everywhere, from Baluchistan to Lorestan, Tehran, Mazandaran, and all of Iran.

In my view, among those three demands, the issue of women is fundamental to the Islamic Republic; it is not merely a moral issue. The oppression of women is, in fact, one of the primary tools of suppression and subjugation of Iranian society. Freedom is everyone’s demand. Life, in the middle of this, is what has risen again. Livelihood, a good life, and welfare were part of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” and “Jina/Mahsa” movement.

But this time, because of the complete economic collapse, it started directly in Tehran and the Tehran Bazaar, in the economy. It was a movement of demands, but it quickly became political, as the social atmosphere necessitated. It spread to students and other classes. This time, the people of Kurdistan supported it. Our own party issued a statement the same day as the strike, or the day after; I don’t recall exactly, and we provided political support several times. But we provided the operational and field support through that call from the Kurdish parties. At that juncture, we felt it was not appropriate to call for street demonstrations because we assessed the regime’s readiness for shooting and killing in Kurdistan to be very high. Therefore, we thought it was sufficient to declare a general strike, and we did exactly that.

Continued: Abdullah Mohtadi on the Path to Overthrow and Pluralistic Leadership

At this time, I have spoken with many people who were in the protests or whose loved ones were there. A common point raised is that those in the streets were explicitly and solely seeking the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. You also mentioned that the community’s economic protests very quickly turned political. Perhaps this is linked to the demand for a “livable life” that was also present in ‘Woman, Life, Freedom.’ But I want to ask: do you think the priority must be ending the Islamic Republic, at any cost?

See, the 47- to 48-year trajectory of Iranian society and its developments has brought us to this point. This is not within the will of a specific individual, a specific group, or a specific party. In the beginning, the majority of Iranian society - I won’t say everyone; you should exclude Kurdistan - a large part of Iranian society said “Yes” to the Islamic Republic. This was for a set of reasons, including the belief that it contained freedom and welfare, and that an autocracy was ending. Many held this view.

I want to say that from that point to the first public protests, massacres, and crackdowns, people then pinned their hopes on reform for a while. They showed patience; they did not lose hope. They voted for Reformists. They participated in elections. But even that path was closed. None of the Islamic Republic’s elections were or are democratic and free, but even at the previous level, they closed the path of the regime’s limited elections through increasing pressure and restrictions imposed by the Guardian Council on candidates’ qualifications.

The Green Movement [2009] was a response to this. People still wanted to do something through the ballot box. That too was drowned in blood. You remember that year’s Ashura, running over people with cars, and the crimes at Kahrizak. Later came 2017, then 2019, then the shooting down of the Ukrainian airplane, followed by the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement and major, fundamental boycotts. These showed that gradually, and indeed with patience, society had broken away from this sovereignty. The gap between the people and the government reached a point where it could no longer be patched or mended. The regime’s legitimacy had no place left except perhaps in 10% to 15% of society. No one believed in elections. Demonstrations led nowhere. Movements were drowned in blood; in November [2019], they killed 1,500 people in just a day or two.

Therefore, I want to say that in this journey society has taken, there was no other way. The sovereignty left no other path for change, transformation, or reform. The illusions that existed in these areas gradually faded in the face of these hard realities. Consequently, society reached this point long ago, and last January’s movement proved it once again on a nationwide scale in the metropolises, in Tehran, and everywhere in Iran. This regime has neither legitimacy nor popularity. Especially with the sea of blood that has been spilled, there is no longer any possibility of compromise with the sovereignty.

Yes, my opinion is that the main axis, the main slogan, and the main goal must be the toppling and overthrow of this system. Other things are not unimportant, and it’s not that it doesn’t matter what future we will have. It is completely important and must be discussed starting now; this is not something we should leave to the future and say, “don’t discuss it.” Discuss it, and we will. But everyone who thinks of Iran’s future in different models, and all those with specific demands - from nationalities, Kurds, women, workers, students, and so on - can each have an opinion. Liberals, the Left, Constitutionalists, and Republicans can and must discuss the future of Iran.

However, the common goal of all these must be the toppling and overthrow of the Islamic Republic. The history of Iranian society and its evolution has brought everyone to the point where no positive change in people’s lives, politics, the economy, or foreign relations is possible except by passing through this system. Look at the recent boasting [by the regime]. They have massacred and killed some 35,000 to 36,000 people. There aren’t exact statistics yet, but it’s estimated in that range. 35,000 people were slaughtered, and they aren’t even fazed; they are ready for the next suppression. What other path besides overthrow do you think can be taken? No other way remains.

You discussed the future of Iran. How do you see it? What do you think will happen? Will the Islamic Republic be toppled by the people, or will there be war?

No one knows whether there will be war or not. There are various predictions, assessments, and analyses, but no one can guarantee 100% whether there will be war. However, the path the Islamic Republic is taking is wrong: adventurous, costly, and chaotic foreign policy in the region and the world, which increasingly points toward war for the U.S., Israel, and, recently, for Europe, with the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization.

This means even Europe no longer believes in this regime, and only a few diplomatic formalities remain that they must perform per diplomatic custom. Otherwise, the regime’s fate is clear even to the Europeans. They might not intervene militarily, or a war with the European side might not happen, but I believe they have given up on this regime and are all thinking about the future. Whether this future is built by the people or not, 100% this future must be shaped and decided by the people, according to their freedom-seeking and justice-seeking needs and aspirations.

But what will be the spark? Is it a war? Is it another movement? It is not yet clear. Neither the decision for war nor its execution lies with us; it is determined by major powers like the United States. They haven’t told anyone 100% yet, and I don’t think they’ve even told their European allies.

The future of Iran must be a free future. A future where there is no inquisition of beliefs; there must be freedom of expression and freedom of the press. There must be full citizenship rights and freedom of parties. I believe the future of Iran must be a secular society. The clergy, with the catastrophes they brought about and their participation in both corruption and the killing of people over these 40 to 50 years, have historically lost their credibility. It is said that the late Ahmad Kasravi stated in the 1940s that Iranian society owes the mullahs one Islamic government. It has paid its debt to the mullahs with blood, the blood of loved ones, and the withering of tens of thousands of youth.

I think the mullahs are finished and must step aside. The IRGC (Sepah) is a bunch of criminal mafias - seven-headed mafias - that should have no role in Iran’s future. The IRGC must be disbanded. Not that every individual should be put to the sword; no, I believe in transitional justice. I believe the IRGC is not Iran’s army. The IRGC is an ideological armed force protecting a specific system, not protecting the country of Iran. Therefore, it must be disbanded. I fully believe in transitional justice. I do not accept individual vengeance, individual violence, or blind violence. I hope we have the minimum amount of violence. This is what I want for the transition period.

But for Iran’s future, I think about the major issue: there are many fault lines in Iran. One is the ethnic fault line, which concerns the nationalities of Iran. No one has enmity with the Persian language, but how much longer can millions of Iranian children be deprived of education in their mother tongue? How much longer can they be deprived of having local parliaments and assemblies to manage their own affairs?

The future of Iran must be democratic. It must have democracy, and this democracy must be diverse and pluralistic. It must accept diversity and plurality; it must accept public participation. These are important demands. But I think Iran will see neither democracy nor peace and comfort if we do not bravely and clearly deal with the problems and dilemmas that have remained unsolved for decades - if we do not deal with them clearly and discuss them explicitly, if we fear dialogue. We shouldn’t insult, but we shouldn’t fear dialogue with each other, no matter how explicit and clear it is.

I think if monopolism doesn’t prevent it, and if the effort to establish a new autocracy instead of an old one doesn’t prevent it, the people of Iran will ultimately accept the best path, which is pluralistic democracy. Kurds, women, workers, students, and all strata can eventually, in the light of freedom over a six-month to one-year period, draft a good constitution in which the fundamental rights of the people are recognized and protected according to the law. If we accept this diversity and plurality, whether in ethnic, linguistic, and cultural fields or in different political tendencies, and provide solutions for it, which I believe is possible and doable, then we see a good future awaiting Iran. I hope no one thinks of hijacking this revolution. This revolution belongs to everyone. I’m not saying it belongs to Republicans, or Kurds, or a certain political tendency. It belongs to everyone, and everyone must be tolerant of one another.

Are the non-monarchist fronts in Iran thinking of a coalition with each other? On the other side, there are monarchist groups making their voices heard; a portion of the people want them. What about the non-monarchist groups? Are they seeking to bring their views closer together?

Monarchist groups, or as you say, monarchism, are one of the tendencies that exist in Iranian society. Even if they didn’t exist or were minimal, they have gathered a force for themselves. Assessing their extent is difficult for me. But they, in any case, constitute a part of the Iranian people and have the right to be active in the policy and form of government they believe is right. There is no argument there. However, extremism from any side is condemned and gets us nowhere.

As for what non-monarchist groups should do or are doing, there have been efforts, and there still are. We ourselves follow this with interest, participate in some of these efforts, and support them. But these efforts should not be such that we forget who the main enemy is and have the two sides jump at each other. Instead of jumping at each other, if we truly think Iranian society is too pluralistic to be managed by one tendency, or for one tendency to be the driving force of the popular movement - which is what I think, as I believe in this plurality - then if monarchism does not represent all of Iranian society and all demands (and I can say this with absolute certainty about Kurdistan), those who favor pluralistic democracy should gather together. They should also create a reference, create a force, and make themselves known.

Instead of saying, “that demonstration’s numbers weren’t that high, they were fewer,” that’s not the solution. Your solution is to step into the middle yourself. Those who believe in pluralistic democracy must step forward. They must create gatherings, hold necessary conferences, and ultimately create a reference point, a center, and a new political entity within the Iranian opposition, which is not just abroad but primarily inside the country. Such a political entity should be formed, and then, in parallel, both [fronts] work for the overthrow. That is when the atmosphere of the opposition, demonstrations, and gatherings inside and outside becomes a pluralistic one.

I think at the bottom (in society), it is still pluralistic, but because there is no one at the top to represent it, or only one side is representing it, everyone thinks there is no other voice but that one. No! That voice exists. At the bottom, that plurality exists; everyone doesn’t think the same way. Everyone wants the Islamic Republic to go, but one group is shouting its specific slogans. Let them! My point is that this plurality is at the bottom, but at the top, at the level of political management, leadership, and political entity, it has unfortunately not yet formed. But the necessity is there, and it must be worked for.

There are similarities between your words and those of Mr. Pahlavi last week in Munich, specifically regarding being pluralistic and respecting others’ opinions. I want to ask you: you and six prominent Iranian political figures formed the “Mahsa Charter” after the 2022 protests. What happened that caused this alliance to fall apart?

I don’t think it’s right to exhume that. As far as it concerns me, I wasn’t the one who turned my back. I broke no promises. I didn’t leave, and I still stand by the signature I gave, and I hope others do too. Indeed, the coalition didn’t continue in that form, but that document is an interesting and valuable one that represents pluralism, freedom, and nobility. It represents participation in political power. Anyone who defends tolerance, pluralism, and the non-use of physical and verbal violence is speaking correctly, and it is a very appropriate act.

However, as I have said elsewhere, the “Emergency Period Booklet” (a reference to a specific political proposal) does not reflect such plurality. It does not reflect a desire for democracy. On the contrary, it represents authoritarianism, a new autocracy, and a type of monopolism. Therefore, “a good year is evident from its spring,” and unfortunately, it is not evident here.

Are you ready to sit down with non-monarchist groups and then enter dialogue with monarchists?

A coalition must be formed of those who believe in pluralistic democracy and gather around this axis. If it doesn’t, a great vacuum will form in Iranian society and will bring negative consequences. Large sections of society that feel they are not represented at the top level will become discouraged. We, to the extent of our ability, whether as a party or as a Kurdish movement, can and wish to participate, and if we have a role, to play it. As for what will happen later and whether negotiations will take place or not, it cannot be predicted from now, but why not?