On March 13, 1969, in exercising its constitutional power of “advice and consent,” the U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, aka Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (“NTP”) by a vote of 83 to 15. On behalf of Iran, the treaty was signed in Moscow by Ahmad Mirfendereski, the then-Iranian ambassador to the Soviet Union, when the treaty was opened for signature (1 July 1968) in London, Moscow, Paris, and Washington D.C. 729 U.N.T.S. 169, 201 (I-10485, 1970). The treaty became binding on Iran on the day of its entry into force on March 5, 1970.

Section 1 of Article IV of the treaty states: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-173 (emphasis added).

Worried about Iran’s intentions about developing nuclear weaponry, the U.S. and like-minded countries decided to limit Iran’s nuclear activity to a level compatible with what they understood to be consistent with peaceful use of nuclear energy. After many years of back-and-forth, on July 14, 2015, Iran and the P5+1 (five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council: China, France, Russia, U.K. and U.S. plus Germany) together with the European Union inked the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”), which limited the Iranian nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and other provisions.

Echoing the long-held sentiments of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his cohorts in the U.S. Republican establishment, the presidential candidate Donald J. Trump began bad-mouthing the JCPOA with such characterizations as “disaster” and “worst deal ever,” often emphasizing his ability to make better deals! On May 8, 2018, the newly-elected President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA, much to the dismay of some of the other parties to the agreement. Thus Iran was freed (rightly) from the strictures of the JCPOA, which resulted not only in accumulation of highly enriched uranium but also in the Iranian personnel acquiring technical knowhow that otherwise would have been stymied or delayed under the JCPOA if it had been left to operate.  

Having returned to office in January 2024, President Trump has set a date certain to extract from Iran, under threat of military action, the deal that only he can make. A deal extracted under threat is not a deal; it is extortion.

The air in Washington surrounding the current nuclear talks is confused. There are pronouncements about ‘Iran never ever having a nuclear bomb’ and ‘Iran never ever being able to develop a nuclear weapon.’ It is this latter position that has led to the out-right demand that Iran give up its right to enrich uranium, not even for purposes of nuclear energy, turn over its entire stockpile of enriched uranium, and import, if it must, nuclear fuel for its energy production purposes! Iran has pushed back on this point by underlining, highlighting and insisting on its unalienable right under the NPT to master nuclear fuel-cycle technology, which includes enrichment of reactor-grade uranium.

Like most other rights in international affairs, once surrendered, it will be lost forever. To that extent, therefore, as far as Iran is concerned, Witkoff kos migeh, Araghchi doros migeh! Moreover, the idea of importing nuclear fuel from sanctions-happy trading “partners” with a very sketchy general record of reliability is anathema to the proposition khod-kafa-i zamen-e esteghlal ast (“independence rests upon self-sufficiency”), not in making oneself a potential hostage to other foreign demands that one cannot refuse because one is dependent on another for its critical supply of nuclear fuel.

There may be something more nefarious at work here. The United States’ insistence on ‘no enrichment whatsoever’ could be designed to ensure the failure of the nuclear talks, at the conclusion of which then the United States will proclaim that it has done all that it could, and walk away. This disengagement, should it come to pass, will be in line with President Trump’s diplomacy-by-bombast which often results in no visible gain, such as his efforts to end the conflict in Gaza or the war in Ukraine, which leaves the door open to the likes of Netanyahu to carry on as he pleases in Gaza and for Putin to go on with his “special military operation” in Ukraine. In the face of “failed” Iran nuclear talks, Trump can continue with his sanctions against Iran and, worse yet, Netanyahu will feel unrestrained to attack Iran militarily, something that he has been itching to do for as long as memory serves.

For the Iranian government, the stakes are very high. Further economic and financial stress, coupled with after-effects of possible military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities (with its attendant collateral damage), will be deleterious to the government’s longevity. Meanwhile, the government devoted considerable resources to the restarting of its post-JCPOA enrichment program, which now is being asked to surrender – yet again! – and then pay to import nuclear fuel from abroad! That is a big pill to swallow. 

Perhaps by capitulating to U.S. demands, Iran can live to fight another day, when it can shed the shackles of its nuclear capitulation in 2025 just like when the country finally rid itself as it did in the 1920s of the kapitolasyon (consular capitulary privileges and immunities) that was brought upon it by foreign powers beginning in the early 1800s.