Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

Alarabiya

The tension surrounding Iran’s nuclear program has reached a critical point, with the likelihood of a military option against its nuclear facilities growing higher with each passing day. What was once an Israeli warning has now been echoed by US President Donald Trump, signaling an increasing consensus that Iran’s nuclear program must be stopped through force if necessary.

Trump recently sent a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, making it clear that the United States would not stand idly by if Iran continued its nuclear advances. His message was direct: while Washington still preferred a diplomatic resolution, a military option is on the table if Tehran refused to halt its program. This shift suggests that military confrontation is no longer a distant possibility but a rapidly approaching reality.

Iran’s nuclear advancements have only exacerbated these concerns. According to the latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has significantly accelerated its nuclear activities, bringing its enrichment levels dangerously close to weapons-grade purity. The IAEA revealed that Iran has been enriching uranium at its Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, at a level alarmingly close to the 90 percent threshold required for nuclear weapons. These findings have sent shockwaves across the international community, fueling fears that Tehran is on the brink of obtaining a nuclear bomb. The IAEA has also warned of Iran’s increasing lack of transparency, with its inspectors facing significant restrictions in accessing key nuclear sites. This has raised further suspicions that Iran may be deliberately obstructing oversight to conceal the true extent of its nuclear progress.

Given Iran’s growing isolation and economic struggles, it may seem surprising that Khamenei has publicly rejected Trump’s outreach. In his response, Khamenei dismissed the notion of negotiations, branding the United States a “bully” and reiterating that Iran would never engage with Washington under duress.

At first glance, this defiant stance appears counterintuitive. Iran is at its weakest point in decades, facing immense economic hardship, regional setbacks, and internal discontent. Under such circumstances, one might expect Iran to seek de-escalation rather than risking further confrontation with the world’s most powerful military and its closest Middle Eastern ally. One of the most significant blows to Iran’s regional influence has been the loss of the Assad regime in Syria. For years, Iran has relied on its strategic alliance with Damascus to expand its influence across the Levant, using Syria as a bridge to supply Hezbollah in Lebanon and other allied militias. Without Assad, Iran’s ability to project power in the region has been severely diminished, cutting off a vital link in its so-called “Axis of Resistance.”

Iran’s regional proxies have also suffered significant setbacks. Israeli military operations have repeatedly targeted Iranian-backed groups, depleting their resources and weakening their effectiveness. Hezbollah, once seen as Iran’s most formidable non-state ally, has faced mounting challenges, including Israeli airstrikes on its weapons depots and command centers. The cumulative effect of these setbacks has left Iran’s network of allies more vulnerable than ever before.

Domestically, Iran’s economic woes have fueled widespread dissatisfaction. The country remains under crippling US sanctions, which have decimated its economy and caused the national currency, the rial, to plummet. Inflation has soared to record levels, making basic goods unaffordable for many Iranians. The energy crisis has further exacerbated these issues, with frequent power outages and fuel shortages adding to the public’s grievances. Under these dire conditions, Iran finds itself in a precarious position, one that would seemingly discourage any escalation with external adversaries.

Yet, despite these challenges, Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations with the United States is not as perplexing as it may initially seem. The Islamic Republic was founded on revolutionary principles that define its very identity, chief among them the staunch opposition to the United States – the so-called “Great Satan.” This anti-American stance is not merely rhetorical; it is a core pillar of the government’s legitimacy. If the Iranian leadership were to suddenly shift its posture and engage in negotiations with Washington, it would risk undermining the ideological foundation upon which it has stood for over four decades. Khamenei, as the ultimate guardian of the revolution, cannot afford to be perceived as compromising on this fundamental principle.

However, Iran’s political system operates on two distinct levels: public rhetoric and private pragmatism. While Khamenei maintains a hardline stance in public, he has historically allowed his government to engage in backchannel negotiations when the survival of the government is at stake. This dual-track approach was evident in 2015 when Iran, despite Khamenei’s public hostility toward the US, agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under President Hassan Rouhani. At the time, Iran’s economy was in dire straits, and Khamenei, recognizing the necessity of economic relief, permitted Rouhani to pursue a deal with the West. The nuclear agreement provided temporary sanctions relief, allowing Iran to stabilize its economy while maintaining the façade of ideological resistance.

The same pattern appears to be unfolding once again. When Trump was re-elected in November last year, Iran immediately began reaching out to the European powers – Britain, France, and Germany – to initiate indirect negotiations. Tehran’s swift reaction suggested a recognition of the potential consequences of a second Trump administration. Iranian officials feared that Trump’s return to the White House would lead to even harsher economic pressure, renewed military threats, and a possible Israeli-led strike on its nuclear sites with US backing. This fear prompted Iran to test the waters for a diplomatic solution, even as Khamenei continued his public defiance.

The contradiction between Khamenei’s rhetoric and the Iranian government’s actions highlights the government’s ongoing struggle to balance its revolutionary principles with the practical need for survival. On one hand, Iran cannot afford to completely abandon its ideological opposition to the US, as doing so would risk alienating its hardline support base and calling into question the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic itself. On the other hand, the government’s deteriorating economic and geopolitical position necessitates a degree of pragmatism to avoid total collapse.

In essence, Iran is trapped between ideology and pragmatism, navigating a precarious path where both extremes present existential risks. If it remains rigidly committed to its revolutionary principles, it may find itself isolated, economically crippled, and vulnerable to military action. Yet, if it fully embraces pragmatism and seeks a rapprochement with the US, it risks eroding the very foundation upon which its authority rests. This dilemma has defined Iran’s approach to foreign policy for decades, and it remains at the heart of its current predicament. As tensions continue to escalate and the window for diplomacy narrows, the world watches closely to see whether Iran will lean further into its revolutionary ideals or embrace pragmatism behind closed doors. Whatever choice it makes, the consequences will shape not only Iran’s future but also the broader stability of the Middle East.