The New York Times:

By Nicholas KristofMegan K. StackBret Stephens and Stephen Stromberg

The United States and Israel have been conducting airstrikes on Iran for a week and a half. Stephen Stromberg, an editor in Opinion, on Wednesday convened the Opinion columnists Nicholas Kristof and Bret Stephens and the Opinion contributing writer Megan K. Stack to discuss how the war is developing and how it might end.

The conversation has been edited for clarity.

Stephen Stromberg: How has your view of the war changed over the last week and a half? Nick, why don’t you start?

Nicholas Kristof: I thought attacking Iran was a terrible idea but that there was always some small possibility that it would actually succeed and prompt an uprising. Now that seems more unlikely than ever, partly because President Trump has acted in ways that boost Iranian nationalism — with talk of arming the Kurds, attacks on cultural sites, his failure to apologize for a strike that hit a girls’ school — and arguably help the regime.

I also thought that the war might end quickly, partly because both sides would want it to. Now I think it may drag on, in part because Iran seems intent on re-establishing deterrence, making the West pay a substantial price so that it is less likely to attack again. Paradoxically, Iran may be happier than Trump to lengthen the war.

I’ve also been surprised that the Trump administration seems to be contemplating inserting ground troops, either to try to recover Iran’s highly enriched uranium or to seize Kharg Island, Iran’s oil export hub. Both would risk significant casualties and make an exit even more difficult.

Bret Stephens: I’m flabbergasted by the relentless pessimism I’m seeing in much of the commentariat. We are less than two weeks into a war that will almost surely be over by the end of the month, and already there are predictions that it’s “another Iraq.” American casualties, heartbreaking as they are, have been minor for a conflict of this scale. Iran’s ability to threaten its neighbors diminishes by the day: We’ve seen this in the sharp decline in its ballistic missile and drone attacks. I have to assume that before this war is over, we will find a way to remove Iran’s remaining stores of highly enriched uranium, which greatly enhances global security over the long term. And Iran’s leaders, for all their swagger, now know they are not immune from reprisal, which will make them think a lot more carefully as they plot their retaliation. We may not see regime change now, but this regime is likely to become a zombie state before the next, all-but-inevitable, popular uprising.

Megan K. Stack: As a country, we need to take a beat and look at ourselves. This is an illegal war, lacking congressional or U.N. Security Council backing. Two U.S. acts early in the war were bombing an Iranian ship off Sri Lanka and letting dozens drown, and, it appears, bombing an Iranian girls’ school, killing more than 150 people.

A few things came into focus this past week. One, we’re starting to see some of the destabilization that Trump is inviting, in the oil markets and the standstill in the Strait of Hormuz, in Lebanon, Turkey, the Persian Gulf and on and on. Two, it is now clear that our government cannot articulate why we started this war or what we’re trying to achieve. And, three, so far, the countries gaining are Russia and, to a lesser extent, China.

Stromberg: So, sharply differing takes here. A lot rides on what you think will happen to the Iranian regime and what that means for the world. Bret argues it could turn into a zombie regime, unable to suppress its people for much longer. Nick and Megan, what do you make of the likelihood of such an outcome, and how might its realization shift your thinking about the war’s costs, if at all?

Kristof: Sure, that might happen. And Iran might give up its nuclear program and become a fully democratic state. But I wouldn’t bet on any of that. It’s certainly true that the regime is exceptionally unpopular; I’ve rarely reported from a country where so many ordinary people tell you how much they despise the government. I had thought that after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei died on Feb. 28, there was some possibility of change and reform. But that seems less likely now. The West thought that killing Khamenei would accelerate change. He might have thought that if he were “martyred,” that would help preserve the regime and keep hard-liners in power, and he may have been right.

I’m also skeptical that a zombie regime would be harmless. The Houthis in Yemen are in some sense a zombie group, yet they are still a threat in the Red Sea. As long as Iran has dhows, it can lay mines in the Strait of Hormuz. I worry that even a zombie regime could make a new drive for nuclear weapons. I suspect that Iran’s new leadership may think that one mistake the country made in the past was enriching uranium without actually creating weapons, for that provoked the West without deterring it. There may now be a greater push to actually build the weapon, which would be a catastrophe for proliferation in the region and might be within the capacity even of a zombie regime.

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