Responsible Statecraft:

By TYTTI ERÄSTÖ

Rather than helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the Israeli-initiated 12-day war on Iran damaged the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In response to the attacks on its nuclear facilities, on July 2, Iran suspended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose responsibilities include verifying NPT state parties’ compliance with their nonproliferation commitments. At the same time, these illegal attacks, which the U.S. joined, have created the conditions for the kind of endless war that President Trump allegedly wants to avoid. While the prospects for Iranian-U.S. diplomacy in this context look bleak, there might still be a way out through regional non-proliferation cooperation.

The end of nuclear transparency in Iran

Iran’s suspension of cooperation with the IAEA marks the end of nuclear transparency provided by agency inspections in the country since 1974. Thanks to this transparency, we knew, prior to June 13, the exact amount and locations of Iran’s fissile material stockpiles — which could not have been diverted to military uses without being noticed by the IAEA. Now, due the Israeli and U.S. attacks, this knowledge has been lost.

Israel — whose goal appears to be to weaken and remove the Iranian government, rather than just its nuclear program — is likely to push for additional military actions. That Iran’s nuclear capabilities were, predictably, not all destroyed by the military strikes, makes it difficult for Washington to restrain Israel even if it wishes to do so. This points to the open-ended aggression that experts have long warned would result from attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Apart from its perception that the IAEA is politically biased in favor of Israel and Western countries, Iran’s decision to suspend cooperation with the agency arguably reflects a concern that nuclear transparency might undermine its interests. By indicating the location of nuclear materials and facilities that survived the war, IAEA findings could be used to facilitate future Israeli and U.S. military targeting.

Demonstrating the flawed logic of aggressive counterproliferation, the war on Iran could be seen as a perfect argument for Tehran to leave the NPT and develop a nuclear deterrent. After all, the use of force against its territorial integrity can constitute a circumstance in which “extraordinary events have jeopardized [its] supreme interests,” the legal basis for withdrawal under the NPT’s Article X.

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