Amwaj

The story: The Syrian city of Aleppo has fallen to Sunni militants for the first time since 2016 after a lighting offensive. Iran has reacted by moving to rally support for Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is currently on a regional tour of Damascus and Ankara. At the same time, Iran does not seem to be in a rush to significantly expand its direct military presence—possibly to remind Assad that he owes his rule to Tehran’s intervention a decade ago.

The coverage: The Sunni Islamist Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and allied factions launched a major offensive on Nov. 27 to seize control of Syria’s second-largest city.

  • By Dec. 1, the militants had taken control of the “majority” of Aleppo, according to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
  • Russia confirmed on Nov. 30 that it had carried out airstrikes in rebel-held territories in support of the allied Syrian government.
  • SOHR on Dec. 1 claimed that Moscow had carried out “a series of airstrikes” as Sunni opponents of Assad advanced further south of Aleppo.

Notably, the HTS-led offensive was launched on the same day that a US-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah went into effect.

  • Israeli media on Dec. 1 reported that the Israeli military had intercepted an Iranian cargo plane en route to Syria and forced it to turn back, suspecting it of carrying weapons meant for Hezbollah.

In a post on Twitter/X, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Dec. 1 that developments in Syria are meant to distract from Israel’s war on Gaza.

  • Referring to the militants based in northwestern Syria, Khamenei said actions by “takfiri groups” benefit the “enemies of Islam.” Takfiri refers to Salafist jihadists who deem other Muslims—especially Shiites—as heretics.
  • “Exactly at a time when all [of the] Islamic Ummah’s attention is focused on the issue of Palestine, Takfiri groups, instead of concentrating on [the] Zionist regime’s malevolent nature, draw the attention to other places,” Khamenei’s English-language account posted.

As the opposition forces advance, Iranian officials have warned that only Israel and the US stand to benefit from the Syrian civil war flaring up.

  • Addressing the Iranian parliament on Dec. 1, President Masoud Pezeshkian urged Muslim nations to “intervene and not allow America and Israel to take advantage” of the Syrian conflict.
  • Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf accused Tel Aviv and Washington of being behind the militant offensive and called on regional powers to “enter the fray to neutralize this dangerous conspiracy.” He added that Iran “backs” the Syrian government and people “in fighting small terrorist groups.”

Iran has long maintained a contingent of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers in Syria which it refers to as “military advisors.”

  • Esmail Kowsari, a hardline lawmaker and former senior IRGC commander, said on Dec. 1 that Iran does “not have many” advisors on the ground in Syria.
  • The lawmaker added that a decision on whether to send forces depends on developments in Syria and Iran’s top brass.
  • Israel has over the past year assassinated the senior IRGC Quds Force command in Syria. This triggered an unprecedented direct Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.

Four days after the lightning offensive, on Dec. 1, Foreign Minister Araghchi left for Syria to meet Assad.

  • Araghchi later told reporters that the meeting was “helpful, clear, and friendly,” adding that they discussed “the details of the support that needs to be provided for Syria.”
  • The Iranian top diplomat added that “good understandings” were reached without elaborating. Araghchi is now set for high-level meetings in Turkey, which has long backed Sunni opponents of Assad, and will also reportedly travel to a third unnamed destination.
  • In an apparent attempt to project calm, Araghchi was filmed dining out at a local fast food restaurant in Damascus after his meeting with Assad.
  • Separately, Pezeshkian on Dec. 1 discussed developments in Syria with Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani. A day earlier, Qalibaf held a phone conversation with his Lebanese counterpart Nabih Berri on regional issues, particularly Syria.

The context/analysis: The IRGC was in 2013 deployed to Syria to assist Assad in suppressing an armed uprising and fighting Sunni extremist organizations.

  • The exact number of Iranian "military advisors" who lost their lives during the Syrian conflict remains unknown.
  • While some reports suggest that over 2,000 "defenders of the shrine"—a term frequently used to refer to Iran-backed forces—were killed, most of those casualties are thought to have been Afghan nationals organized by the IRGC.
  • Assad managed to stay in power thanks to Russian air support and Iran putting boots on the ground.

Iran has reportedly spent billions of dollars in Syria and is not likely to let it go to waste. Yet, it may not be in a rush to come to Assad’s aid for now—if only to remind him of his fragile position.

  • Tehran has welcomed Damascus growing closer to Arab capitals that had shunned it when the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, partly driven by the calculation that only Gulf Arab capital can realistically fund major reconstruction. However, with western sanctions and continued political obstacles preventing the latter from materializing, tensions have persisted.
  • In particular, Syria has steadily gravitated toward the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is seen by observers as having played a role in Damascus largely staying out of the Gaza war. The conflict has notably dragged in the broader Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’.
  • Iran views Syria as a key member of the Axis, which also brings together Shiite armed groups in Iraq, Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Yemen’s Ansarullah movement—better known as the Houthis.

The future: Syria plays an important role in Iran’s deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Israel and the US and serves as a staging ground to transfer weapons to its regional allies.

  • Iran is unlikely to allow Assad to fall, especially without a fight. But it may also use this opportunity to further strengthen its influence in Damascus.
  • Mindful of Syria’s importance in Iran’s deterrence posture, Israel can be expected to continue to attack allies of the Islamic Republic—not to mention a potentially growing IRGC presence down the line.
  • Iran will continue to engage with its Russian and Turkish partners in the Astana process, if only to thwart further moves by Ankara to put pressure on Assad.