Iran in 1980, photo by R. Matthee

Was the Iranian Revolution Inevitable?
On the anniversary of Iran’s 1979 Revolution

By Fariba Amini

When my father took his resignation to Ayatollah Khomeini, after serving only one month as Governor of Fars under the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan,  Khomeini took the letter from him and told him, "So now you are snubbing me?   If I had snubbed the Iranian people, this Revolution would never have happened."    When Ruhollah Khomeini arrived in Tehran on an Air France jet and was asked how he felt coming back to his homeland,  he said, "I feel nothing.” 

Millions on the streets felt something.  A revolution was happening. 

The Shah had already left,  tears in his eyes.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 remains one of the most poignant and important events of the 20th century.  Its causes and reasons are widely discussed to this day.  Regardless of how we interpret its origins, it was an event that changed Iran’s course of history forever, creating a Republic part based on Shi’a beliefs.   Today,  after more than 4 decades,  the Iranian nation faces adversaries both internally and externally.  Suffering from inhumane sanctions,  mismanagement and wide-spread corruption, human rights violations, interference in various neighboring countries,  now a pandemic,  Iran faces an uncertain future.

One may ask was this Revolution really necessary? 

Could it have been avoided?  

The following are views from politicians and scholars of Iran on this very subject.

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr,  the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran:   

For a revolution to take place,  certain elements have to be present both within the state and the people.

Until then, a revolution is not inevitable.   It is possible to prevent the emergence of such elements.  Even after their appearance,  and before the revolutionary wheel gets into motion, it is possible to manage the changes in the government.   But after the elements have manifested themselves in the state, they render it ineffective.   Especially when an autocratic state that is also without a social base cannot act in the regional and global arena, and the elements that have emerged in the people have stirred up a movement,   a revolution becomes inevitable.   

Abbas Amanat-  Professor,  Yale University:

For the secular middle classes, at home or in exile, who saw themselves as victims of the Islamic Revolution, for the disillusioned revolutionaries soon to be cast aside, and for many observers wishful for a better turn of events, one question persisted: Was the revolution, or rather the Islamic Revolution and the way it prevailed, avoidable? The short answer to this seemingly ahistorical question is a cautious no. It can be argued that in August 1978 the appointment of the Sharif-Emami government removed the last chance for adopting an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary course. Without dabbling too much in such a virtual course, it could be argued that an evolutionary process probably was untenable at the time not so much because of the potency of the opposition or the shah’s aversion for the democratic process but because of long-term dynamics already in place.

A quarter of a century of autocratic rule since 1953 had effectively demolished the political infrastructure on which a democratic regime and a sound civil society could be built. Even as late as 1975 if, instead of creating the bogus Rastakhiz Party, the Pahlavi regime had allowed some measure of liberalization and had permitted moderate but genuine political parties to emerge, there still would have been a chance. Instead of deafening propaganda campaigns glorifying the Sunlight of the Aryans, if the shah had permitted some measure of free speech and free press, an evolutionary process still would have been plausible. If Savak had not engendered an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, of arrest and torture, of military courts, of repeatedly crushing student protests and completely suppressing any independent voice, there could have been a different political outcome.

Instead, the shah’s regime inadvertently paved the way for a popular revolution as the only alternative to his autocratic conduct, especially during the 1970s. In the absence of genuine political institutions and the growth of a middle class devoid of political agency, the rise of a populist demi-prophet like Khomeini is understandable. He was a mirror image of the shah in his undemocratic outlook, though distinct from the Pahlavi ruler in every other respect. The regime over the years had recklessly facilitated the growth of leftist extremism and clerical loyalties by virtually eliminating all moderate alternatives. But the radical left was the victim not only of the Pahlavi regime but also of its own naïveté, ideological alienation, and cult of martyrdom. It had little popular support. The Qom clerical movement, in contrast, proved resilient, shrewd, and capable of building grassroots support.

Over a longer historical span, the march toward a revolutionary upheaval arguably was set as early as 1953, when the last chance for a democratic process was lost, or was taken away, depending on how we would look at it. One might even trace the origins of the revolutionary quest further back, to the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution and the rise of the Pahlavi modernity, when maturation of the nascent political process effectively came to a standstill. Yet seminal to the causes of the 1979 revolution, even more than 1921 or 1953, were the developments of the 1960s, when the land reform freed generations of land-bound villagers from rural Iran and brought them into the cities. These newcomers fueled a popular revolution that came to fruition in large part because of their sheer multitude.

That the 1979 revolution was destined to acquire an “Islamic” face is another debatable issue. Islamic, as it became blatantly clear, meant not merely respect for Islamic moral values in a secular constitutional framework. Nor did it mean merely honoring a national icon in the person of Ayatollah Khomeini. As the revolution unfolded and turned into an Islamic Republic, it became painfully clear that Islamic meant something more: a radical state with theocratic underpinnings, or more accurately, a hierocracy headed by an authoritarian guardian jurist and buttressed by an oligarchy with militant clergy at its core. Utilizing modern means of ascendency and control, the republic’s clerical elite and subservient lay cohort quickly deployed weapons of intimidation and violence. They added to this concoction a generous dose of anti-Westernism and Islamist idealism, the former largely a legacy of people like Al-e Ahmad and the latter, that of Islamists like Shari‘ati.  Beyond these considerations, one can identify structural underpinnings that for centuries helped shape Shi‘i Iran. That the Pahlavi secular project eventually gave way to a religiously defined revolution cannot be viewed in isolation from a century-long rift between the state and the Shi‘i establishment. Nor can one ignore the widening gap dividing the Iranian secular from the religious worldview, a gap that the state-sponsored modernity could not successfully bridge. Moreover, the revolution can be fully understood only if we take into account dormant messianic traits in Iranian Shi‘ism, which periodically revolted against the state and religious establishment. The 1979 revolution demonstrated a remarkable affinity with these features while operating almost entirely on a different trajectory, as became more apparent in the decade after the revolution.

Houchang Chehabi, Professor,  Boston University:

That depends at which point. In December 1978, William Sullivan, the last US ambassador to Iran, sent a telegram to Washington titled "Thinking the Unthinkable." That would seem to indicate that he thought by then a revolution was inevitable. The Shah always made concessions too late, when what he conceded was no longer sufficient to assuage the opposition. Once the Shah had left, perhaps the revolution would have turned out differently if the forces of the left had fully supported the moderates around Mehdi Bazargan. One thing is clear: Very few Iranians in 1978 believed in liberal democracy, especially among the young people in the streets.

Ervand Abrahamian, Professor Emeritus, City University of New York: 

The 1979 revolution was inevitable because the monarchy lost its legitimacy in 1953. The shah was well aware of this and consistently in 1951-52 refused to support the idea of a coup because he argued forcefully that if he went against Mossadeq and Oil Nationalization he would undermine his throne. He was eventually dragged into the coup by the US that threatened to replace him with one of his brothers. Much of his policies after 1953--White Revolution, Two Thousand Year Monarchy, One Party State, Gendarme of the Persian Gulf, and grandstanding as an OPEC hawk--were all designed to gain some form of legitimacy lost in 1953. Instead of strengthening his position, these policies further alienated the general public and paved the way to the revolution.

Afshin Matin-Asgari,  Professor,  California State University argues in his book,  Both Eastern and Western:  An intellectual History of Iranian Modernity :

The 1978–9 revolution, and its “Islamic” trajectory, were neither predetermined nor “unthinkable” sui generis “events,” impervious to predication and/or post-facto interpretation. While the rumblings of the monarchy’s political fault lines were audible throughout the 1970s, the Shah’s ultimate fall was the outcome of accumulating contingent crises, each of which could have been handled differently, thus defusing the revolutionary build-up or leading to another kind of political transformation. A different political outcome could have been possible, for instance, had the Shah restored constitutional government in 1977, when the opposition was led by secular liberals, rather than the radical left or Islamists. 1970s. In this perspective, a revolutionary terminus to the unfolding 1970s political crisis, as well as the revolution’s “Islamist” character, were contingent phenomena, appearing increasingly “inevitable” only in 1978.

At the same time,  the monarchy’s fatal political hemorrhage was largely self-inflicted, caused by a succession of serious mistakes that, by the late 1970s, opened the political arena “wide open” to a rapidly radicalizing opposition .  The Shah’s final strategic  blunder,  i.e.  was his 1975 launch of the  Resurrection Party,  a project meant to overhaul the country’s political system beyond the frame of the Shah-People Revolution.

Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Professor and Director,  School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech:

I don't believe the revolution was inevitable. A whole host of factors came together to make a perfect revolutionary storm possible.  As they say revolutions are not made, they just happen. However, in a counterfactual manner one can ask what if the Shah had not acted in the way he did (less censorship, less regal arrogance)? What if he had allowed the citizenry to read Khomeini's books to get a better sense of what his vision for the future of Iran was? What if he had designated Shapur Bakhtiyar as Prime Minister a year early?

Yann Richard, Professor Emeritus at the Sorbonne Nouvelle:

Could the Revolution have been avoided? Probably yes, provided it had been known to which catastrophe it would lead, not just in Iran but in the entire region and, by way of Islamist terrorism, in the entire world. But history is inexorable; we can try to understand it, but we are unable to change it. The rapid development of oil riches and the greed this unleashed among the great powers, first Great Britain and then the United States, made the Americans blind to the consequences of their Iran policy. They admired the shah for his reforms and refused to see that he was alone in this. In the words of Lord Acton, “Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. The maturing political awareness of the Iranians could not accept a lopsided enrichment and a strategy that depended on one single person. To impose respect for human rights on Iran meant the burst of a pressure cooker. The people’s visceral rejection of the shah meant the rejection of the American alliance and recourse to the Islamic discourse as a way to push back the excessive power of the West. In that sense the Revolution was inevitable. “Such a policy breeds resentment and, if not moderated, it risks an equally un-Persian and equally forceful future response”, wrote an American diplomat on January 28, 1975, referring to the capacity of Iranians to adapt to adverse situations.   (Documents from the US Espionage Den, Iran Embassy, CIA Station 1979, vol. 7, p. 136). History gave him right.

Darioush Bayandor,  independent scholar and former diplomat:

Brzezinski recalled in his memoirs, “Revolutions become inevitable only when they happen”. Historical precedents of revolutionary movements which were crushed make a legion; suffice it to remember the Tiananmen in 1989.  Revolutions in general are the product of multiple factors with unequal impact on the outcome. In the case of Islamic revolution cultural, historical, political, socioeconomic, demographic and even psychological variables played a part but the principle factor relevant to the inevitability of the revolution were a streak of ill-conceived decisions he made when in 1974 he realized that his lifetime was cruelly shortened. I have delved on issue at length in my book but in two words the decision by the Shah in 1974 to double the size of the fifth development plan, which resulted in sever stagflation, the Rastakhiz blunder, even more consequential the decision in 1976-7 to open floodgates by the policy of Azadsazi or liberalization, were variables that could have changed the course of events. The latter policy was misunderstood across the political spectrum as sign of panic and fleeing forward before the Carter phenomenon. In actual fact the decision was all about the shah’s succession concerns. 

Stephanie Cronin, professor,  St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University:

The Iranian revolution was not inevitable. It was the result of the conjunction of several different crises, with separate but interrelated dynamics and trajectories. These crises were national, regional and global. The Iranian monarchy was besieged by multiple domestic problems, its repressive methods of dealing with opposition alienating much of civil society and depriving the shah of legitimacy. The wider Middle East was going through a period of political turmoil and upheaval, with Iranian radicals in touch with revolutionary movements especially in Dhofar and the Palestinian refugee camps. The Iranian regime also found itself confronting a generation of young people profoundly influenced by the Third Worldism and hostility to the United States typical of the 1970s. At the same time,  a novel variety of political Islam articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini began to exercise an enormous appeal. The shah accordingly found himself, in the late 1970s, confronting a perfect storm, a conjuncture, which he could not negotiate.

Mansour Farhang,  professor emeritus, Bennington College and former Iranian Ambassador to the UN: 

The ‘if in history’  can be a titillating topic  for poets and fiction writers but not useful to political or historical commentators.   In contrast, focus on unintended consequences of human action reveals how misperception or impulsive action can pave the way for shocking historical ironies.

It is fair to say that  Iranian revolution of 1979 could not have happened the way it did without Khomeini’s leadership of the anti Shah movement. For Khomeini’s uncontested voice against the Pahlavi monarch excited not only the leftist, liberal and nationalist opponents of the Shah but also the masses of urban poor who were not politically active or viewed as even a potential threat to the status quo. This situation was unimagined  by both the Shah and Khomeini.

In mid 1978 the Shah decided to humiliate Khomeini in the expectation of discrediting him politically.  First he ordered publication of an insulting article against him in a newspaper that echoed the monarch’s positions and then pressured Saddam Hussein to expel him from Iraq. The 1975 Algiers Accord resolving border dispute between Iran and Iraq had resulted in a rather cordial relationship between the Shah and Saddam Hussein.

According to Iraqi documents seized by U. S. intelligence after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Saddam advises the Shah not to do did. He promises the Shah to prevent Khomeini from issuing any statement or engaging in political activity.  That was not enough for the  King of Kings and the leader of the Great Civilization. He dismissed Saddam’s suggestion and urged him to kick the Ayatollah out as soon as possible. Saddam reluctantly submitted and ordered his men to take Khomeini to Kuwait’s border and expel him from Iraqi territory.  And the Shah asked Kuwait not to issue him visa to enter the country. So the Ayatollah spent three days in the custom area of Kuwaiti airport. Ebrahim Yazdi flew from Texas to Kuwait to find an Islamic country that would be willing to give Khomeini a visitor’s visa. Even with his American passport he could not persuade any of them. The Shah’s influence  in the Islamic world proved to be decisive. 

At the time Iranians did not need visa to visit France. Khomeini hated the idea of going to a European country. He was even willing to go to Indonesia but his request  was denied. Thus Yazdi took Khomeini to Paris expecting that it would be  a temporary stay there until they can persuade an Islamic country to accept Khomeini’s request for visa.  His arrival in Neauphle-le-Chateau, a village near Paris, marked the beginning of his notoriety as an international celebrity. Diaspora Iranians subscribing to competing political perspectives were all united in praising him as the leader of the revolutionary movement against the Shah. At the same time, Khomeini’s taped speeches in Neauphle-le-Chateau were sent to Iran and played in mosques and Muslim gatherings for urban poor who soon began to see the Ayatollah’s picture on the moon.

Khomeini was very surprised of his celebrity status among secular Iranians in addition to massive international attention he was attracting.  This situation transformed the Ayatollah into a masterful Machiavellian. Thus he began to tell journalists and admirers what they wished to hear. He was for democracy, human rights, gender equality, political freedom and civil liberties for all. I interviewed him in late December 1978 for an article I was commissioned to write for Inquiry Magazine published in San Francisco. I began the interview by introducing myself as a professor teaching in California.  He replied, “I am also a طلبه (talabeh, a religious student) and nothing I wish more than returning to Qum to resume my studies.” His words were music to my ear - the leader of the anti-Shah movement was not interested in power.  About a year after the fall of the Shah and Khomeini’s advocacy of sectarian policies, when an Italian journalist asked him how he justified his liberal and democratic ideas advocated in France, he replied “خدعه کردم” (I lied) Khomeini had a dark side to his character and possession of absolute power fed this dark side to make him a vengeful sociopathic political animal. 

The Shah could not comprehend the fact that his decision to ask Saddam Hussein to expel Khomeini from Iraq fueled the engine of the revolutionary movement.The unintended consequence of his supposedly clever decision was too surreal for him to comprehend. So he died being convinced that president Carter and Western oil companies had plotted against him and Khomeini was simply a tool used by them. Khomeini was as surprised with the consequence of his unwanted move to France, but he had a more popularly appealing explanation: God, in his supernaturally mysterious way,  had chosen him to lead the revival of Islam in the world.