Responsible Statecraft:

By François Nicoullaud

Paradoxically, leaving the JCPOA could prove attractive, especially if implemented at the right moment, that is before the triggering of the dispute resolution mechanism enshrined in the deal. Iran would then avoid being dragged to the U.N. Security Council for non-performance of its commitments and therefore escape the fast-track procedure of reimposition of U.N. sanctions. This procedure, also known as the “snap-back” procedure, needs only one vote from one of the five permanent members of the Security Council members to reimpose the sanctions lifted with the endorsement of the JCPOA by the Security Council in July 2015. However, by its very construction, such a procedure can only be put in motion when there is a breach of commitment from a party to the JCPOA. If Iran were to quit the deal in time, there would be no more Iranian commitments, and therefore no possible breach of commitments. To make this point clearer, all parties accepted that the very day President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the United States was relieved of all its resulting obligations. What has been accepted for the U.S. has to be valid for Iran.

The dangers of withdrawal

But, at first sight, the benefits of such a decision would be short-lived indeed. First, Iran could still be dragged to the Security Council and condemned by a new resolution. However, this would have to go through the standard procedure, that is a positive vote of nine out of its fifteen members, with no negative vote of any of its five permanent members — obviously more difficult to achieve than the specific “snap-back” process. A bigger risk would be to see the United States and the Europeans reunite and impose together their own sanctions on Iran, as already done between 2010 and 2012, with painful consequences. Even worse, with the end of the JCPOA, any significant development of the Iranian nuclear program could easily be presented as a rush to the bomb. At some point, some governments, U.S., Israeli, even European, could feel entitled to react by the use of force.

Alleviating the risks

The Islamic Republic could, however, alleviate these three risks with a single formal statement, reiterating its intention to abide, henceforth on a purely voluntary basis, by all the main commitments formerly contracted in the framework of the JCPOA: maintaining under ceiling the number of its centrifuges as well as enrichment levels and low-enriched uranium stockpile; curbing the development of advanced centrifuges; confirming its intention not to develop the technology of reprocessing, and, most important, accepting the continuing implementation of the extended controls provided for by the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol.

This double move, if properly presented and implemented, should be able to deter any possible action against Iran before the Security Council, and an escalation of threats. Actually, the Iranian nuclear case would enter a wholly new landscape. And with the disappearance of the JCPOA, Donald Trump would be deprived of his main argument in his fight against “the worst agreement” ever signed by the United States.

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